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Background: Psychopathy is a controversial psychological construct with a 
contentious history. Ambiguity regarding its pathology persists, coincident with long-
standing critique of the construct. Contemporary research indicates ontological 
confusion, limitations with assessment practices, and the presence of a negative 
bias towards individuals identified as psychopathic; the implications of this raise 
serious ethical concerns. Despite this, the psychopathy construct is used within 
forensic settings to understand the psychology of forensic service users; in 
particular, clinical psychologists hold status as a professional group able to 
understand, assess for, and confer the presence of, psychopathy. In addition to the 
aforementioned limitations, there is also a lack of research into the accounts of 
clinical psychologists working in forensic settings.  
 
Aims: To examine how clinical psychologists discursively construct psychopathy, 
including an investigation of the discourses and subjectivities produced and utilised 
in their talk, and the implications for action resultant from these.  
 
Method: Eight one-to-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with clinical 
psychologists currently working in forensic mental health contexts (low, medium and 
high secure). Foucauldian Discourse Analysis was used to analyse the data.  
 
Results: (1) Persons with psychopathy were constructed as problematised 
individuals. Constructions arose from four overarching discursive sites: dangerous, 
challenging, manipulative, and psychologically deficient. ‘At risk’ and ‘trauma’ 
discourses were utilised to explain the aetiology of psychopathy. ‘Intuition’ talk was 
employed by participants as a marker of the presence of psychopathy. (2) The 
psychopathy construct was identified as contested and problematic. To manage this, 
a variety of subject positions were taken up; three overarching subjectivities were 
identified: pragmatist, subversive, and expert/specialist. (3) Accounts pointed to a 
psychological imperative for psychopathy. Central to this was the promotion of three 
core psychology technologies: formulation, supervision, and reflective practice. 
These were constructed as solutions to the ‘problem’ of psychopathy in different 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will provide a rationale for exploring the accounts of clinical 
psychologists working directly with those with a label of psychopathy1 in forensic 
mental health settings. I will first outline how my interest in this area emerged, 
followed by a summary of contemporary scientific and diagnostic understandings of 
psychopathy. I will then chart the emergence and development of the construct, from 
late Eighteenth century to present. I will examine issues pertaining to the practice of 
psychopathy and will then provide an overview of the main research drives to date, 
highlighting limitations and ambiguities. Lastly, I will outline the small body of 
research which examines professionals’ accounts from a critical frame and which 
implies the need for alternative approaches to research and practice in the area of 
psychopathy.  
 
The literature search strategy adopted for this study involved searches of 
psychology, medicine and science-based academic electronic databases (PsycInfo, 
PsyArticles, Science Direct, ProQuest, PubMed), general databases (Web of 
Knowledge, Sage), and Google Scholar for relevant articles and book chapters. 
Initial search terms were a combination of the following: 
 
1. (professional) or (forensic) or (clinical) or (psychologist) AND  
2. (account) or (talk) or (construction) or (perception) or (attitude) AND 
3. (psychopathy) or (psychopathic) or (antisocial2) AND 
4. (discourse) or (discursive) or (analysis)  
 
Following extensive abstract scanning, the most relevant and recent literature was 
selected and comprehensively analysed. Additional relevant references within these 
texts were also sourced and subjected to the same process of analysis.  
1 Psychopathy is a socially produced construct; inverted commas are implied on all uses of the terms 
psychopathy, psychopath and psychopathic.  
2 Within several academic databases, the term psychopathy was subsumed by the term antisocial 
personality disorder due to recurrent overlap in the literature base.  
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 1.1.1 Background to the Research 
Several years ago, during my first week of working at an NHS secure forensic 
hospital, I was told that a long-term service user on the ward was a diagnosed 
psychopath, and was advised that he had a tendency to cause trouble so should ‘be 
careful’ around him. This was my first experience of the word in a clinical context and 
I recall that it took me by surprise; I remember feeling shocked and excited and, 
then, more afraid of the man in question. I later learnt that some time ago, a 
psychopathy assessment, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003), 
had been conducted and through this process the man had been confirmed to have 
met the threshold which identified him as psychopathic. A year or so later, I observed 
and contributed to discussions regarding a particular service user and his ability to 
engage with the hospital’s therapeutic programme. During these discussions, the 
word ‘psychopath’ was used, although at this point the man had not been formally 
assigned this label. A psychopathy assessment, the PCL-R, was later conducted and 
through this process he was confirmed to have met the threshold which identified 
him as psychopathic. I found myself reflecting on previously held discussions and 
comments about these men; their treatability, how they were experienced by others, 
the unique difficulties they posed to ward staff, and the overwhelming sense of 
hopelessness regarding their outcomes. I thought about these in relation to ‘layman’ 
depictions of the psychopath and also wondered about my own responses to the 
word, and to these men. It struck me that much was taking place in these 
interactions and I was moved to investigate this further. 
 
1.1.2 The Forensic Mental Health Context 
Admission to UK forensic mental health services is a likely outcome for individuals 
who present with serious offending behaviours and who are considered to be a high 
risk to themselves or others, in the context of a severe and enduring mental health 
diagnosis. Specifically, three levels of secure care- low, medium and high- reflect the 
nature and degree of offending and risk, as well as the gravity of an individual’s 
mental health difficulties. Within forensic mental health contexts, the category of 
psychopathy is widely applied as a means of understanding service user behaviours 
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and in order to support decision-making regarding care and discharge; the PCL-R is 
the assessment tool typically used to do this (Cooke, Michie, Hart & Clark, 2004).  
 
Traditionally, UK mental health legislation has sought a distinction between 
personality disordered and mentally ill offenders, however research indicates 
problems with this delineation, pointing to comorbidity within the forensic psychiatric 
population (Blackburn, Logan, Donnelly, & Renwick, 2003). Service users detained 
in secure hospital environments under the Mental Health Act (Department of Health, 
2007b) are considered to pose a serious danger to the public (Rutherford & Duggan, 
2008; The Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 2007). Individuals who have 
committed crimes and have a diagnosed mental health difficulty are constructed as 
falling between the categories of ‘ill’ and ‘bad’; thus, a tension occurs as to whether 
they should be punished for their crimes or treated for their mental health difficulties 
(Peay, 2002). Care and treatment are a priority for forensic mental health services, 
typically through a multi-disciplinary care model (The Sainsbury Centre for Mental 
Health, 2007). Simultaneously, services are designed to ensure secure detention of 
those admitted, by restricting movement and freedom of choice. The effect of this is 
to join medical language of ‘care’ and ‘treatment’ with criminological and custodial 
practices of control, so shifting the meaning behind these concepts (Richman & 
Mason, 1992). As Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin, and Stowell-Smith (1995) 
note, tensions arise in this construction when individuals have finished their 
‘treatment’ but remain under legal restriction or are considered too dangerous for 
discharge.  
 
Multiple studies indicate that stigma, prejudice and discrimination are a routine 
feature of forensic services, particularly for service users with a label of psychopathy. 
Studies have shown that staff experience an ‘empathy-deficit’ towards forensic 
service users, moderated by the nature of their crime and diagnosis (Bogojevic, 
Zigmund, Ziravac, & Pavic, 2013) and hold negative views towards those with 
personality disorder diagnoses (James & Cowman, 2007; Lewis & Appleby, 1988). 
More specifically, studies investigating forensic staffs’ perceptions of individuals 
identified as psychopathic indicate that they are experienced negatively compared to 
other forensic service users, with a tendency towards ‘therapeutic pessimism’ 
(Salekin, 2002), a trend for ‘management’ work rather than ‘therapeutic’ work 
9 
 
(Bowen & Mason, 2012; Mason, Hall, Caulfied, & Melling, 2010; Mason, Caulfield, 
Hall, & Melling, 2010), and that the label increases clinicians’ perception of risk and 
future criminality (Rockett, Murrie, & Boccaccini, 2007; Sörman et al., 2014). A 
related concern regarding staff burnout is also present across the literature 
(Crawford, Adedeji, Price, & Rutter, 2010; Moore, 2012).  
 
1.2 What Do We Mean by ‘Psychopathy’? 
 
1.2.1 Psychopathy as a Concept 
The Ministry of Justice (2011b, p. 4) defines psychopathy as a “particularly severe 
form of antisocial personality disorder” and states that it is an important personality 
disorder-type within offender services due to its relationship with high levels of re-
offending, violence and failure to comply with treatment. Despite this imperative, an 
absence of clarity with regards to the conceptualisation of psychopathy persists 
(Kirkman, 2008; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Lilienfeld & Arkowitz, 2007). Multiple 
definitions of the construct are used which are, at times, contradictory and only 
partially overlapping (Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld, & Cale, 2003). 
Additionally, the status of psychopathy has shifted often, as has its symptomatology 
(Walters, 2013). Therefore, it is not reasonable to assume that clinicians and 
academics share a common understanding of this psychological construct.  
 
Most mainstream literature into psychopathy has particular descriptive qualities in 
common. These are a lack of empathy, and a ‘cold’, callous personality, as well as 
behavioural features of impulsivity, antisociality, criminality and a failure to act 
‘morally’ (e.g. Berg et al., 2015; Farrington, Ullrich, & Salekin, 2010; Schaich Borg et 
al., 2013). Notably, some proponents of psychopathy argue that the construct should 
be operationalised according to personality elements alone (Blackburn, 1998; 
Cooke, Michie, et al., 2004). Though beyond the remit of this research, some 
contributors to the field argue that psychopathy is an adaptive response to the 
pressures of modern social life, suggesting that an absence of conscience or moral 
scruple does not preclude pro-sociality (Galang, 2010; Holmes, 1991)3. It is possible 
3 Given the forensic-specific context of this thesis, this small body of literature has been omitted from 
the literature review. 
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that a bias towards research participants from prison and forensic settings has, for a 
long time, prevented elaboration of these ideas (Mullins-Sweatt, Glover, Derefinko, 
Miller, & Widiger, 2010; Widom & Newman, 1985).  
 
1.2.2 Psychopathy as a Classification 
In the UK, psychopathy has historically been a legal rather than a clinical category 
(Holmes, 1991). The term is not formally used within the most recent American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders 
(DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) or the World Health Organisation’s 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; World Health Organisation, 1992), 
nor is it recognised as a clinical diagnosis by any psychiatric or psychological 
organisation (Moss & Prins, 2006). Despite this, psychopathy holds status as a long-
standing, even archetypal personality disorder construct (Crego & Widiger, 2014). A 
prevailing assumption is of the presence of an underlying ‘essence’ to psychopathy, 
an essential causal difference (impairment); the nosological task is, therefore, to 
capture this essence through the use of appropriate diagnostic criteria (Parker, 2002; 
Zachar & Kendler, 2007). Likewise, a long-standing endeavour to identify the 
presence of psychopathy across prison and forensic populations persists (Widiger & 
Lynam, 1998). Attempts at this task can be seen from the first DSM publication 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1952), which included a classification of 
‘sociopathic personality disturbance’, characterised by callous and hedonistic 
behaviours, a lack of responsibility, and including presentations previously 
conceptualised as ‘constitutional psychopathic state’ and ‘psychopathic personality’ 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1952, p. 38).  
 
Within both the DSM and ICD diagnostic systems, the closest diagnostic equivalent 
to psychopathy is considered to be antisocial personality disorder (APD), with which 
it is believed to share key symptomatology, such as lack of empathy/ inadequate 
conscience development, incapacity for mutually intimate relationships, callousness 
and impulsivity (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health Organisation, 
1992). Despite broader critiques of the DSM, including concerns regarding the 
potential for inappropriate application of stigmatising medical labels, it continues to 
be the primary, internationally-used classification system of mental health difficulties 
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across clinical settings and research contexts (British Psychological Society, 2011b).  
Accordingly, this research draws on a DSM-type classification of psychopathy and 
related concepts. For instance, the most recent advent of DSM-V signalled proposals 
to change the term ‘antisocial’ to ‘antisocial/psychopathic’, suggesting continued 
motivation to shift the APD diagnosis toward a psychopathy construction (Trull & 
Widiger, 2013). A lack of reliability and validity lead to the withdrawal of the proposed 
change (Widiger, 2011; Zimmerman, 2012), though not without contention (Lynam & 
Vachon, 2012). National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2010) 
estimates that approximately 10 percent of individuals with APD meet the criteria for 
a label of psychopathy, as measured by the PCL-R. However, the issue of whether 
or not APD and psychopathy are diagnostic equivalents remains unresolved and a 
heated debate persists as to the validity and usefulness of this concept conflation 
(Coid & Ullrich, 2010; Hare, Hart, & Harpur, 1991; Hare, 1996; Skeem, Polaschek, 
Patrick, & Lilienfeld, 2011). Irrespective, since its third edition (DSM-III; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1980), the DSM has gained legitimacy as a result of its use 
of empirical positivist research to validate diagnostic categories. Thus, through APD, 
the technology4 of the DSM produces a researchable category which maps onto a 
biopsychosocial model of pathology and enables the study of antisociality and 
deviance in ways that the intangible category psychopath cannot (Pickersgill, 2013).  
 
1.2.3 Psychopathy within this Research 
In the broadest sense, psychopathy is conceptualised as a constellation of traits and 
behaviours (Buzina, 2012). Beyond this, there are many well-documented 
disagreements regarding what constitutes psychopathy (Miller & Lynam, 2012; Scott, 
2014; Skeem et al., 2003). There are also several related terms which may or may 
not be implicated. This study does not seek to offer a definition of psychopathy; such 
an action would stand in opposition to its epistemology, research questions and 
methodology. However, in the interests of providing some boundaries of 
understanding, I have elected to exclude the terms ‘Machiavellianism’, ‘dissocial 
personality disorder’ and ‘sociopathy’. While I acknowledge that there are inherent 
problems with selective terminological inclusion criteria, these terms are not typically 
4 ‘Technology’ here is used in the Foucauldian sense, meaning ‘technologies of power’, which are 
mechanisms by which particular power/knowledge arrangements are maintained (Foucault, 1988b). 
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utilised within UK forensic or clinical populations and had minimal purchase in the 
literature.  
 
The appropriateness of including or excluding APD is less clear given ongoing 
debate regarding its relatedness to psychopathy (see section 1.2.2). While there are 
obvious limitations with conflating the terms psychopathy and APD, this issue is by 
no means close to resolution in the field of psychopathy research, nor is it within the 
aims or remit of this thesis to attempt to clarify this conceptual dilemma. As such, 
research reviewed for this study was careful to include literature which applied the 
term APD synonymously with psychopathy (e.g. Pickersgill, 2014; Reid, 2001). 
 
1.3 A Brief History of Psychopathy: A Critical Perspective 
 
In order to locate this research and to make explicit the contemporary meanings and 
connotations of the term psychopathy, a historical examination of its origins and 
development is necessary. Moreover, a disambiguation of the term is an essential 
task given the folkloric status of psychopathy (Cohen, 2002), and the oft 
acknowledged tendency to rely on mythology and anecdote in place of accuracy 
(Berrios, 1999; 1996; Hamilton, 2008). Of note, although the major proponents and 
their ideas are outlined here, more extensive histories can be found elsewhere, for 
example, Jones (2016) provides an extended analysis and historical account, while 
Arrigo and Shipley (2001) include a useful table on the historical contexts of 
psychopathy. 
 
1.3.1 The Sociocultural Climate and the Rise of Psychiatric Expertise 
Biopolitical societies, such that govern human life via regulation of the body, began 
to take shape in the Seventeenth century (Oksala, 2013). The origins of psychopathy 
as a formal clinical construct cannot be traced beyond the early 1800s (Henderson, 
1939; Werlinder, 1978). At the time of the Enlightenment across the Western world, 
‘reason’ became highly valued, while ‘unreasonable’ (deviant) behaviour was 
increasingly sectioned off from wider society via social practices such as lunatic 
asylums (Foucault, 1988a). Furthermore, pressing philosophical debate relating to 
the nature of humanity and individual agency, and seismic shifts in societal and 
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cultural structures brought on by global capital and rising secularity, coincided to 
produce huge societal anxiety (McKeon, 1985). Within this climate, the profession of 
psychiatry was establishing itself; concerns about criminality, social deviance and 
preoccupations regarding the boundary between madness and sanity, provided the 
ground for psychiatry to take up a professional position with public authority and 
expertise on diseases of the mind or intellect (Scull, 1979, 1993). As Szasz (1978, p. 
xvii) described: “[W]ith the decline of religion and the growth of science in the 
Eighteenth century, the cure of (sinful) souls, which had been an integral part of 
Christian religions, was recast as the cure of (sick) minds, and became an integral 
part of medicine”.  
 
Thus by the end of the Nineteenth century, criminals, the mentally ill, the disabled 
and the poor had become the targets of psychiatric ‘individualisation programmes’ 
(Rose, 1999). Within this frame, notions of moral insanity, antisocial personality and 
psychopathy were made possible, leading to the growth and intersectioning of the 
criminal justice system and health and welfare services (Jones, 2016).  
 
1.3.2 The Beginnings of the Construct of Psychopathy 
Physician Benjamin Rush was the first figure to break with theological explanations 
of criminality by advancing scientific criminological thought (Rafter, 2004). Rush 
(1839, p. 1) posited the presence of a ‘moral faculty’ which, he argued, was the 
“capacity in the human mind of distinguishing and choosing good and evil”. As 
Werlinder (1978) notes, Rush’s work was significant because it sought to redefine 
insanity as a mental disease and in so doing, shifted criminality away from the remit 
of the clergy and into the purview of psychiatry, thus marking the beginnings of a 
medicalisation of offending behaviours. 
 
Although a source of contestation (Berrios, 1999; Horley, 2013a), the widely held 
assertion is that aliéniste Phillippe Pinel offered ideas which would lay the 
foundations for contemporary understandings of psychopathy. Drawing on three 
case studies from his work, Pinel (1806, p. 150) proposed the presence of “manie 
sans delire” (mania without delusion) to refer to individuals presenting without 
apparent thought disorder but some perceived psychological disturbance. He 
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described the phenomenon as a “perversion of the active faculties, marked by 
abstract and sanguinary fury, with a blind propensity to acts of violence” (p. 156). 
What is not so widely acknowledged is that only one of Pinel’s three cases describes 
an individual who might be understood as psychopathic by anything like today’s 
understanding of the construct (Whitlock, 1982). As Arrigo and Shipley (2001) 
highlight, Pinel’s explanation was largely morally neutral, and thus stands in contrast 
to later definitions, which demonstrate more pejorative characterisations. As a 
consequence of the advancement of Pinel’s theory, psychiatrists were increasingly 
seen as authoritative experts on issues relating to criminal psychiatry paving the way 
for them to take on the role of expert-witness in criminal justice proceedings 
(Goldstein, 1998). As Foucault (1991) and others (Medina & McCranie, 2011) have 
posited, this positioning was an essential component of psychiatry’s claim to power 
and points to the intersectioning of law, medicine and morality; where psychopathy is 
located. 
 
1.3.3 Early Nosologies of Character Disorder 
In the context of the development of positivism in the late Nineteenth century and 
psychiatry’s quest to establish itself as a scientific endeavour alongside other, well-
established forms of medicine, efforts were made to predict and codify human 
behaviour into disease categories using the methods of the natural sciences 
(Rapley, Moncrieff, & Dillon, 2011). Through this process, psychiatrists (and later 
psychologists) could ‘scientifically’ delineate the boundaries of social deviance and 
morality (Sarbin & Mancuso, 1970) leading to social condemnation of individuals via 
medical categorisation (Arrigo & Shipley, 2001). Central to this endeavour was the 
concept of ‘norms’, acquired by medicine shortly after 1800 (Hacking, 1996). Early 
attempts in this process signal the point at which previously disjointed ideas relating 
to inferiority, amorality and antisocial or harmful behaviour were merged (Millon, 
Simonsen, & Birket-Smith, 1998).  
 
The term ‘moral insanity’, put forward by physician James Cowles Prichard, is 
regarded as the first nosological definition akin to contemporary understandings of 
psychopathy (Augstein, 1996). The term is also sometimes regarded as one of the 
earliest depictions of contemporary notions of ‘personality disorder’, due to its 
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foregrounding of an individual’s character as a site of disorder (Elliott & Gillett, 1992). 
Psychiatrist Julius Koch included a cluster of disorders termed ‘psychopathic 
inferiorities’ in his extensive and systematised categorisation of mental disorders 
(Jones, 2016), while psychiatric nosologist Emil Kraepelin outlined sub-sets of 
‘psychopathic personalities’ which, he proposed, were the consequence of a faulty or 
defective constitution, present from birth and persisting throughout the life course 
(Crocq, 2013). Later editions of Kraepelin’s work included the sub-type ‘born 
criminal’; professional criminals were believed to derive from this sub-type of the 
overarching disorder (Horley, 2013a). By defining deviant behaviour as a medical 
problem, the medical profession (in this case psychiatry) is mandated to provide 
treatment (Medina & McCranie, 2011). Kraepelin’s categories of disordered 
personality types have had a lasting impact on the development and understanding 
of the notion of personality and its classification across mental health systems 
(Bentall, 2003; 2006).  
 
1.3.4 The Birth of the Modern Psychopath 
Psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley’s seminal text The Mask of Sanity (1941) detailed 
several dozen case studies as the basis for identification of 21 characteristics of 
psychopathy. Across later editions spanning several decades, he refined the number 
of characteristics to 16. Table one outlines these characteristics from Cleckley’s final 
publication of the work: 
 
Table One: Cleckley’s Clinical Profile of the Psychopath 
1. Superficial charm and good "intelligence" 
2. Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking 
3. Absence of "nervousness" or psychoneurotic manifestations 
4. Unreliability 
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity 
6. Lack of remorse or shame 
7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour 
8. Poor judgment and failure to learn by experience 
9. Pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love 
10. General poverty in major affective reactions 
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11. Specific loss of insight 
12. Unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations 
13. Fantastic and uninviting behaviour with drink and sometimes without 
14. Suicide rarely carried out 
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated 
16. Failure to follow any life plan 
Taken from Cleckley (1988) 
 
Until this point, theories of psychopathy had been predominantly biological. Although 
Cleckley’s work did not offer any substantial theory as to the causation of 
psychopathy (Werlinder, 1978), it served to shift the paradigm of psychopathy 
towards a psychological conceptualisation (Jones, 2016). Around the same time, 
psychoanalysis emerged as a primary psychological approach, which located the 
aetiology of pathology and corresponding behaviours in an individual’s childhood 
psychosexual development, and away from collective, societal responsibility 
(Ramon, 1986). This theoretical influence is apparent in Cleckley’s language, for 
example he describes psychopaths as incapable of “object love” (1988, p. 361) and 
as being “fragmented” persons (p. 367). Moreover, Cleckley’s work reveals particular 
concern with regard to sexual behaviour, focussing more explication on this 
characteristic than others (Jones, 2016). In earlier editions of the work, the female 
case studies he presents are notable for their sexual promiscuity rather than 
antisocial behaviour, and are portrayed more as moral, rather than legal, offenders 
(Horley, 2013a). As behaviour considered sexually promiscuous shifts according to 
time, culture and gender (Le Moncheck, 1997) it cannot be said to reflect a fixed 
truth about what it means to have a ‘psychopathic personality’. Notably, this stands 
in contradiction to the notion that the psy-disciplines are seeking value-neutral 
knowledge (Danziger, 1990). 
 
The clinical profile outlined by Cleckley is the basis of contemporary understandings 
of psychopathy (Arrigo & Shipley, 2001). Most notably, the Psychopathy 
Checklist, developed by psychologist Robert Hare in the 1970s, is a modernisation 
and operationalisation of Cleckley’s clinical profile (Patrick, Hicks, Krueger, & Lang, 
2005). The updated version, the PCL-R (Hare, 2003), is the most widely used 
psychopathy assessment tool. It was developed for research purposes, however, 
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many textbooks (and clinicians) recognise it as a diagnostic tool (e.g. Molinari, 
2015). It has since been adapted for multiple populations and settings; the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Screening Version (Hare, Cox, & Hare, 1995) and the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Youth Version (Forth, Kosson, & Hare, 2014). Hare 
conceptualises psychopaths as “intraspecies predators” (1998, p. 196) whose 
behaviours are “the result of choice, freely exercised” (1999, p. 25). Table two 
outlines the features of Hare's (2003) two-factor model. Individuals are marked on a 
scale of 0 to 2 according to the presence of each feature. The process comprises a 
clinical interview with the person under assessment and evaluation of extensive 
clinical documentation. In the UK, a score of 25 or above on the PCL-R means that 
the individual under assessment demonstrates characteristics or behaviours 
synonymous with psychopathic personality on the upper end of the spectrum of 
those demonstrated by the population as a whole, resulting in a label of psychopathy 
(Craissati, 2004). 
 
Table Two: Features of Psychopathy According to PCL-R  
Factor 1 Factor 2 Other items 
Facet 1: Interpersonal 
1. Glibness/ superficial 
charm 
2. Grandiose sense of 
self-worth 
3. Pathological lying 
4. Cunning/ manipulative  
Facet 3: Lifestyle 
1. Need for stimulation/ 
proneness to boredom 
2. Parasitic lifestyle 




6. Many short-term 
marital relationships 
7. Promiscuous sexual 
behaviour 
Facet 2: Affective 
1. Lack of remorse or 
guilt 
2. Emotionally shallow 
3. Callous/ lack of 
empathy 
Facet 4: Antisocial 
1. Poor behavioural 
controls 
2. Early behavioural 
problems 
3. Juvenile delinquency 
18 
 
4. Failure to accept 
responsibility for own 
actions 
4. Revocation of 
conditional release 
5. Criminal versatility 





1.4 The Assessment of Psychopathy 
 
As noted earlier, the PCL-R is the primary psychometric measure used in prison and 
forensic settings to establish the presence of psychopathy. It is regarded as an 
effective measure of risk and is commonly used to inform risk assessments 
(Hemphill & Hare, 2004; Loving, 2002; Russell et al., 2013), though this practice is 
not without detractors (Gendreau, Goggin, & Smith, 2002).  
 
While the majority of studies into psychopathy continue to utilise the PCL-R as its 
measure of the presence of the construct (e.g. Morrissey, Mooney, Hogue, Lindsay, 
& Taylor, 2007; Walters, Ermer, Knight, & Kiehl, 2015), the literature also reveals a 
growing body of research which problematises the PCL-R as a meaningful, valid or 
reliable measure of psychopathy. Skeem & Cooke (2010) critique the PCL-R as 
having a monopoly of the field and suggest that the construct of psychopathy has 
become conflated with the PCL-R measure; this can be understood as an example 
of theory-laden observation (Kuhn, 1970). This is also significant because without 
any external validation of the construct (the gold standard for psychometric 
measures) a circularly issue arises: an individual qualifies for psychopathy through a 
high PCL-R score, and their high PCL-R score is evidence of the presence of 
psychopathy (Boyle, 2002; Pilgrim, 2001), thus a double bind ensues (Bateson, 
Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, 1956; Gibney, 2006). There are added concerns that 
forensic assessors may be vulnerable to a ‘partisan allegiance’ affecting the 
reliability and consistency of the PCL-R during court proceedings (Murrie, 
Boccaccini, Johnson, & Janke, 2008). Also, due to its lack of normal distribution, the 
PCL-R has been described as unreliable, particularly in relation to scores at the 
upper end of the scale, meaning that individual case estimates are likely to be 
inaccurate (Cooke & Michie, 2009).  
 
Given this, alternative assessment tools have emerged, such as the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) and the Comprehensive 
Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP; Cooke, Hart, & Michie, 2004). 
These measures and their underlying models profess to conceptualise and assess 
psychopathy in novel ways. Irrespective, recent research points to major limitations 
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of a range of psychopathy assessment tools (Singh, Grann, & Fazel, 2011). The 
implications of this raise serious ethical concerns when one considers that those 
assessed for, and classified with, psychopathy are subject to harsher criminal 
sentencing in Europe (Pham & Saloppé, 2013) and more likely to be sentenced to 
the death penalty in the USA (Blais & Forth, 2014; Edens, Davis, Fernandez Smith, 
& Guy, 2012). A high PCL-R score has also been found to be the strongest predictor 
of whether an individual is recommended for release from high security settings 
(Manguno-Mire, Thompson, Bertman-Pate, Burnett, & Thompson, 2007). 
 
1.5 Sociodemographic Differences of Psychopathy 
 
Thus far, research into sociodemographic differences such as race and gender are 
comparatively minimal. In line with positivist traditions of the broader literature base, 
research which seeks to investigate these differences takes as its starting point that 
psychopathy is a real-but-unobservable fact. In this context, several studies have 
produced mixed findings, indicating reliability and validity issues when the 
psychopathy construct is applied to women (Brinkley, Diamond, Magaletta, & Heigel, 
2008; Salekin, Rogers, & Sewell, 1997; Vitale, Smith, Brinkley, & Newman, 2002) 
and individuals with Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) identities (Kosson, Smith, & 
Newman, 1990; Sullivan, Abramowitz, Lopez, & Kosson, 2006; Toldson, 2002). 
 
Extensive research now exists indicating that BME groups are disproportionately 
represented across mental health contexts; individuals with BME identities are more 
likely to be in receipt of a mental health diagnosis and more likely to be admitted to a 
mental health hospital (Keating, 2009). Within the criminal justice system individuals 
with BME identities are heavily overrepresented as users and underrepresented as 
bearers of positions of responsibility (Blumstein, 2009). In addition, studies have 
indicated the presence of a negative bias in evaluating BME individuals (Garb, 1997; 
Iwamasa, Larrabee, & Merritt, 2000). Given this, it is interesting to note that Black 
men admitted to forensic psychiatric hospitals or secure units are significantly less 
likely to receive a label of psychopathy, or of personality disorder generally (Coid, 
Kahtan, Gault, & Jarman, 2000; Cope & Ndegwa, 1990; Shubsachs, Huws, Close, 
Larkin, & Falvey, 1995). With few exceptions, this issue remains under researched, 
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however there is some suggestion that seemingly disproportionate statistics may 
mask a continued negative bias towards BME individuals (Toldson, 2002). 
Additionally, an analysis of the discourses of black and white men with a label of 
psychopathy revealed differing models of subjectivity according to speakers’ race 
identity (Stowell-Smith & McKeown, 1999), suggesting that subject positions based 
on race potentially impact on what psychiatric labels are possible for an individual to 
be assigned and take up.  
 
In general terms, it is understood that levels of psychopathy are much higher in men 
than women (Cale & Lilienfeld, 2002). Research into gender differences focusses on 
the ways in which the construct converges and diverges along a gender axis, thus 
attempting to identify essentialised differences between men and women. For 
instance, psychopathy in women has been associated with relational, rather than 
overt, aggression (Marsee, Silverthorn, & Frick, 2005), higher rates of promiscuity 
and sexual misbehaviour (Robins, 1966; Salekin, Rogers, & Sewell, 1997), later age 
of onset and less aggression (Silverthorn & Frick, 1999). Since the Eighteenth 
century, the criminal justice system has focused on male offenders rather than 
female offenders (Shoemaker, 2001) and theories of faulty biology or masculinisation 
have developed as explanations for female crime (for an extensive critique see 
Cooper, 2011). In the arena of disordered personalities, women are far more likely to 
be assigned other diagnostic labels such as borderline personality disorder or, 
historically, hysterical personality (Bjorklund, 2006).  
 
Differences in psychopathy assessment profiles have also been noted cross-
culturally; this is significant given that the majority of research samples to date are 
derived from North American offenders and psychiatric service users (Hare et al., 
2000). In the UK, a score of 25 or above on the PCL-R means that the individual 
under assessment demonstrates characteristics or behaviours synonymous with 
psychopathic personality on the upper end of the spectrum of those demonstrated by 
the population as a whole (Craissati, 2004). By contrast, in the USA, the cut-off score 
for what constitutes psychopathy is 30. Some research suggests that the same 
levels of apparent psychopathy traits produce lower scores on a PCL-R assessment 
in the UK compared to North American populations, highlighting a need for caution 
when interpreting scores and making clinical decisions (Cooke, Michie, Hart, & Clark, 
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2005). Nonetheless, this is indicative of the socially contingent nature of 
psychological assessment processes whereby the same person might obtain a 
different assessment outcome depending on where they are assessed.  
 
1.6  Contemporary Psychopathy Research  
 
The main thrust of psychiatric research into psychopathy has been primarily 
biomedical, based on positivist traditions seeking evidence for cause-effect 
relationships according to isolated variables, such as impulsivity, empathy, violence, 
instrumental criminality, callous-unemotional traits and moral judgement. These 
variables are considered observable indicators of the presence of psychopathy. 
Such research priorities follow a long history within psychiatric science of attempting 
to locate biological correlates of pathology which might inform (typically 
pharmacological) interventions (Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001). Other research 
priorities are examination of assessment tools (see section 1.4) and investigation of 
the concept of psychopathy in legal contexts. In a variety of ways, mainstream 
research into psychopathy attempts to theorise a relationship between an ‘abnormal’ 
personality, mind or self and a proclivity for extreme anti-social behaviours (Coid, 
1993), thus pointing to the body as the site of psychopathology (Pickersgill, 2009). 
The majority of this research is based on adult male offenders or forensic psychiatric 
service users. There is also a small body of research from a relativist epistemological 
position, focussing on discursive investigations of the construct, either of the 
accounts of invested individuals or of relevant psychiatric text. The following three 
sections will briefly describe and critically appraise the main findings of relevant 
research, so as to familiarise the reader with some of the assumptions, debates and 
disagreements in relation to the notion of psychopathy.  
 
1.6.1 The Neuroscientific Investigation of Psychopathy 
Compared to neuroscientific research into other psychiatric diagnoses (e.g. 
depression and schizophrenia), neuroscientific investigation into psychopathy is in its 
infancy. To date, this research has drawn several preliminary theories implicating: 
the amygdala (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005); the orbitofrontal cortex (Blair, 2003); 
serotonin neurotransmitters (Dolan & Anderson, 2003); the hippocampus and its role 
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in fear conditioning (Laakso et al., 2001); and the prefrontal-tempero-limbic circuit 
(Weber, Habel, Amunts, & Schneider, 2008). Significantly, contemporary 
neuroscientific research does not appear simply deterministic, often acknowledging 
‘environmental factors’ as having at least some stake in the accounts of psychopathy 
(e.g. Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005). Instead, individuals are constructed as ‘vulnerable 
to’, or at ‘genetic risk of’, developing a disordered personality and their environment 
becomes a moderating force for the manifestation of traits (Rose, 2007). For 
example, neurobiological investigation has been undertaken to examine how genes 
affecting psychopathology might be moderated by early life experiences in the case 
of antisociality (Caspi et al., 2002; Frazzetto et al., 2007; Kumari et al., 2014) and 
psychopathy (Sadeh, Javdani, & Verona, 2013). Such research legitimises and 
reinforces emerging interest in the investigation and identification of controversial 
juvenile or ‘fledgling’ psychopathy (Lynam, Derefinko, Caspi, Loeber, & Stouthmaer-
Loeber, 2007; Lynam, 2002; Skeem & Petrila, 2004), despite the possibility that traits 
used in the assessment of adult psychopathy (e.g. egocentricity, impulsivity, 
irresponsibility) may be normative and transient in juveniles (Seagrave & Grisso, 
2002). Generally speaking, though, neuroscience literature appears less concerned 
with formal investigation of possible aetiological factors of psychopathy; examination 
of the ways in which it is biologically and behaviourally expressed takes precedence 
(Pickersgill, 2009). Thus, neurobiological research seeks to tell us what but not why, 
offering a description but not a theory of causation (Pilgrim, 2001).  
 
A recent popular theory of psychopathy is the presence of a neurobiological inability 
for empathy, an affect considered to be traceable in the brain and experienced pre-
consciously (Baron-Cohen, 2011; Rameson, Morelli, & Lieberman, 2012; 
Soderstrom, 2003). The notion of an absence of empathy maps onto longstanding 
conceptualisations of psychopathy (see section 1.3). This application of 
neuropsychological ‘norms’ has the effect of construing the psychopath as a 
“pathological other” who is not fully human (Bollmer, 2014, p. 299). In this way, the 
neuroscientific literature contributes to the wider construction of a new ‘kind’ of 
person (Hacking, 1995; 2006), one who is affectively deficient. This kind-making is 
made plain in Baron-Cohen's (2011) recent pop psychology text Zero Degrees of 
Empathy, which collects together and examines other instances of empathy 
deficiency (those with diagnoses of autism, borderline or narcissistic personality 
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disorder). The neuroscientific drive of psychopathy research appears to be steering 
biological determinism into complex and sophisticated ground, where research into 
brain structures, neurotransmitters and affect implicated in types of pathology are 
prioritised far beyond psychosocial investigation (Pickersgill, 2009), leading to the 
reconstitution of psychopathy as a totalised identity construction (Angelides, 2005). 
 
Research which utilises modern imaging techniques (e.g. functional magnetic 
resonance imaging, fMRI) has contemporary cultural significance and also holds 
authority within the scientific and clinical communities (Beaulieu, 2002; Joyce, 2008). 
The ideas advanced through such research are subsumed by, and impact on, clinical 
discourse and practice. Following a review of the most recent scientific literature of 
psychopathy, Fowles (2011, p. 94) has argued that reification of the construct of 
psychopathy disinclines professionals from thinking in terms of complex interacting 
factors by wrongly implying the possibility of locating the term psychopath 
“somewhere inside the brain”.  
 
1.6.2 Psychopathy and Aversive Childhood Experiences 
It is widely accepted that adverse childhood experiences such as victimisation, family 
dysfunction and maltreatment are implicated as risk factors for future 
psychopathology (McLaughlin et al., 2010), future offending (Maxfield & Widom, 
1996) and a combination of the two (Laajasalo & Häkkänen, 2004; Matejkowski, 
Cullen, & Solomon, 2008). According to the PCL-R, a key indicator of psychopathy is 
the presence of conduct disorder-type behaviours in childhood and adolescence. 
The literature indicated a trend towards investigation of the presence of adverse 
childhood experiences in the context of psychopathy (see Farrington et al., 2010 for 
a summary of the available research into environmental influences and 
psychopathy). Some studies attempted this via a neurobiological framework (see 
section 1.6.1), more commonly, investigations have been undertaken into the 
attachment styles and childhood histories of those with a label of psychopathy. 
Associations were found for a family constellation of rejecting father/ emotionally 
warm, idealised mother (Frodi, Dernevik, Sepa, Philipson, & Bragesjö, 2001), 
unresolved loss and trauma (Nørbech, Crittenden, & Hartmann, 2013), poor 
parenting (Molinuevo, Pardo, González, & Torrubia, 2014; Salekin & Lochman, 
25 
 
2008), object relations deficits (Brody & Rosenfeld, 2002), familial adversity 
(Giovagnoli, Ducro, Pham, & Woitchik, 2013) and adverse childhood traumatic 
experiences, especially for females (Weizmann-Henelius et al., 2010). Other 
research indicated that child abuse was predictive of high PCL-R scores in 
adulthood, irrespective of gender and race (Weiler & Widom, 1996).  
 
By implication, these studies hypothesise a degree of relational interaction as 
contributing to the manifestation of psychopathic traits. By positioning psychopathy in 
this way, a psychological basis for antisocial and undesirable behaviours is made 
available; however, by implicating individual care-receiving experiences in the 
pathway of the disorder (what might be described as the ‘meso-level’), explanations 
involving wider macro-level factors are avoided (Ramon, 1986). The knowledge 
produced through this research is correspondent with a biopsychosocial imperative 
and contributes to a prevailing discourse that adult psychopaths developed as such 
due to underlying vulnerabilities, in interaction with early environment, including 
impaired attachment experiences. In turn, this points to particular interventive 
practices, as the disordered person is constructed as a site for rehabilitation 
(Foucault, 1991). Thus, interventions which focus on ‘relationship’ as an avenue for 
change are made possible, as are broader political practices, such as the 
development of governmental policy5 and research6, the propagation of a 
Therapeutic Community model across forensic and personality disorder services, 
and the development of highly controversial governmental initiatives of public order, 
i.e. the ‘Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder’ initiative (Cordess, 2002; 
Duggan, 2011; Glen, 2005; Ministry of Justice, 2011a). 
 
1.6.3 Psychopathy in the Court Room 
As discussed (section 1.2) psychopathy has status as a legal term; clinical and legal 
elements of psychopathy discourse have long been integrated (Parker et al., 1995). 
Psychiatry, and latterly psychology, has established its place within courtrooms, 
prisons and parole boards since the 1880s, taking on a privileged position to define 
criminals and their culpability (Garton, 2001). Psychopathy has become a legal 
5 E.g. Personality Disorder: No Longer a Diagnosis of Exclusion (NIMHE, 2003) 
6 E.g. Intervening to Prevent Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Scoping Review. Home Office 
Research (Moran & Hagell, 2001) 
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synonym of ‘evil’; its application in courtroom settings ensures continuity of the law’s 
principles of logic and reason by maintaining a scientific frame of reference and by 
establishing the necessity of expert explanation from psychiatrists and psychologists 
(Ruffles, 2004).  
 
The judicial implications resulting from the use of the term psychopath are 
considerable, and the application of prescriptive outcomes by courts following such 
expert opinion has been raised as cause for concern (Scott, 2014). Given this, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that non-professionals’ understandings of psychopathy, and 
the potential effects of these on legal processes, has been a focus of the literature. 
Research has indicated that the psychopathy label, when applied to individuals on 
trial, has a prejudicial impact based on perceptions of dangerousness far 
outweighing its probabilistic value (Bersoff, 2002; Cunningham & Reidy, 1998; 
Edens, Petrila, & Buffington-Vollum, 2001). Studies examining the perceptions of 
jurypersons found that the label impacted negatively on sentencing outcome (Smith, 
Edens, Clark, & Rulseh, 2014), that laypersons were significantly more likely to 
support a death sentence when the defendant was indicated to be psychopathic 
(Cox, Clark, Edens, Smith, & Magyar, 2013; Edens et al., 2012), and that defendants 
with psychopathy were experienced as less credible (Blais & Forth, 2014). Some 
studies reported a mediating effect based on gender, with men less likely than 
women to support indefinite imprisonment of individuals identified as sexually 
offending psychopaths (Guy & Edens, 2003; 2006). In the context of juvenile 
probation services, the term psychopathy was also found to have stigmatising effects 
(Murrie, Cornell, & McCoy, 2005) and, even when the category was not directly used 
but implied, participants showed increased support for the death sentence and 
decreased support for treatment while in prison (Edens, Guy, & Fernandez, 2003).  
 
Multiple studies into the effects of labelling in various contexts have pointed to 
stigma and dehumanisation as likely outcomes. The negative effects of terms such 
as ‘the mentally ill’ on therapeutic stance (Granello & Gibbs, 2016) and the harmful 
impact of media reports linking mental illness with violence and danger (Bilić & 
Georgaca, 2007; Sieff, 2003) are such examples. Individuals are constructed as 
less-than-human, legitimising social responses such as disgust and fear, as well as 
enabling social practices of segregation, surveillance, punishment and abuse 
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(Hacking, 2004). These studies indicate that language has the power to cast 
particular attributes about objects and people in a prominent light (Holmes & Wolff, 
2011), more than this, it has a constitutive power (Davies, 2000). In addition, labels 
applied to individuals by state institutions have particularly powerful effects, leading 
to internalised stigma (Goffman, 1963; McPhail, 2013). Internalised stigma of mental 
illness has considerable consequences, such as: maladaptive behaviours and 
impeded recovery (Livingston & Boyd, 2010); social exclusion (Sayce, 1998); and 
socially sanctioned economic penalties (Funk, 2004). Related to this, ‘lay theories’ 
are central to the reproduction of stigma (Link & Phelan, 2001) and are imbricated in 
professional/clinical understandings (Manuti & Mininni, 2010). As Rafter (2004) 
suggests, psychopathy is a metaphor for the outsider and other, and its elusiveness 
enables a correspondent social conviction in its existence. 
 
1.7 Previous Investigations of Professional Accounts 
 
Formal examinations of professionals’ accounts are increasingly abundant; many of 
these are in the form of Doctoral theses and cover a wide range of psychological and 
psychiatric phenomena. In contrast, few attempts have been made to explore the 
accounts of professionals working with those labelled as psychopathic; some 
exceptions, which do so from a realist perspective, have been discussed (see 
section 1.1.2). There are also a small number of studies exploring professionals’ 
accounts from a critical stance; four of these were considered directly relevant and 
serve as a ‘springboard’ for the present research.  
 
1.7.1 Accounts of Professional/Expert Text and Talk 
Through Foucauldian discursive analysis of psychiatric descriptions of psychopathy, 
Federman et al. (2009) illuminated the interplay of psychiatric power and the 
construction of the psychopath. More specifically, the authors elucidated a lack of 
epistemological debate as coexisting with prevailing discourses about psychopathy, 
which construct ‘truth’ despite a lack of evidence. They attributed this to the 
prevailing post-positivist paradigm of the scientific domain. The authors argue that 
psychopathy stands as a reference point across contexts for extreme mental and 
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criminal disorder which is co-produced and reinforced via public, political and 
scientific media. This analysis suggests that psychiatry has the capacity to function 
as a form of social control, whereby socially transgressive behaviour is understood in 
diagnostic terms, and that the insistent and uncertain nature of these terms enables 
their reproduction and reinforcement. It also demonstrates an underlying assumption 
within forensic psychiatry and psychology that mental disorder, at least in some 
cases, leads to a propensity for criminal behaviour. This legitimises the 
conceptualisation of criminality in medicalised terms and justifyies the role of expert 
witnesses and preventative treatment programmes (Anckarsäter, Radovic, 
Svennerlind, Höglund, & Radovic, 2009).  
 
Hamilton (2008) examined several contemporary accounts of psychopathy from the 
writings of Robert Hare and Paul Babiak, two major proponents in the field of 
psychopathy research. Hamilton’s analysis uncovered a “seepage” (p. 223) from 
scientific and medicalised constructions of psychopathy into mythical discourse, and 
a tendency for the ‘facts’ about psychopathy to be located in fiction. An uncertainty 
with regards to the scientific construct is exposed and the various ways in which 
psychopathy exists between science and imaginative fiction are delineated. This 
study highlights that, while authoritative ‘expert’ text seeks to establish psychopathy 
as a scientific fact, the concept itself is best detected ‘out there’, and as having a 
mystical or fantastic quality. The findings of the analysis also relate to Foucault’s 
(1991, p. 222) observations of a shift in focus from crime to criminal, whereby 
preoccupations centre on “the danger potentially inherent in the individual”, so 
moving away from the need for an observable transgressive act to punish.  
 
In combination, Federman et al’s (2009) and Hamilton’s (2008) analyses 
demonstrate the blurriness of fact and fantasy in scientific discourse when 
delineating psychopathy and positioning the psychopath. They may also indicate the 
presence of an overlap between ‘professional’ and ‘lay’ understandings of 
psychopathy; such findings undermine claims of empirical objectivity. A tendency 
within scientific journals to refer to the Biblical story of Cain and Abel as “evidence” 
of the long-standing presence of psychopathy is a pertinent example of this 




Richman, Mercer, and Mason (1999) examined forensic psychiatric nurses’ talk 
about deviant behaviour; the authors identified an intertwining of clinical, 
criminological and everyday discourse. Most significantly, the analysis revealed the 
presence of an overarching “taxonomic order of evil” (p. 300), whereby deviancy was 
attributed to an inherent evil in individuals identified as psychopathic. This stood in 
contrast to talk about individuals identified as psychotic, who were positioned as 
innocent via their madness, but denied ownership of action and thought. The authors 
concluded that the availability of a discourse of evil for those seen as psychopathic 
enabled the production of a dichotomy of good and evil, with notions of rationality 
and free-will utilised by participants to evidence this. This research may highlight the 
availability of a grand discourse of ‘disease’ versus ‘deviance’ for psychiatric 
professionals working directly with those with a label of psychopathy. Moreover, this 
study emphasises the socially constructed nature of deviance by evidencing that the 
deviant label can be removed, or minimised, depending on the presence of other 
labels (e.g. ‘mad’) (Gray, 2011). However, for those with psychopathy the deviant 
label has permanence, meaning that rehabilitative or reparative efforts are, by 
implication, impossible. Significantly, Szasz’s (1974) earlier ideas regarding the 
simultaneous disowning of responsibility for, and enabling the social control of, 
‘problem’ people are pertinent here; there is an accepted belief that psychopathic 
individuals deserve the most severe forms of social control because they possess 
characteristics considered to be the most abhorrent. This justifies the use of 
stigmatising labels (‘psychopath’, ‘evil’, ‘deviant’), in order to alleviate any damage 
they cause.  
 
Through analysis of interviews with ‘elite’ neuroscientists, Pickersgill (2009) 
examined ways in which experts discursively constructed APD and psychopathy. 
The analysis uncovered discourses of ‘biology’ and ‘environment’ which were 
employed by participants to explain the development of antisociality. More 
specifically, notions of ‘risk’ were embedded in participants’ talk, which had the effect 
of producing non-deterministic accounts of APD and psychopathy. Additionally, out 
of talk about ‘successful psychopaths’, some ambivalence with regard to pathology 
and its location emerged. Here, as in other studies, Pickersgill emphasises a wider 
context out of which these discourses are possible; a rising focus on the notion of 
‘dysfunctional personalities’ within UK mental health policy and practice (Pickersgill, 
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2010, 2012, 2014) and an underlying uncertainty with regards to their scientific 
categorisation (Pickersgill, 2011a, 2011b), evinces an interface between law and 
health with capacity to shape pathology.  
 
Read together, Richman et al’s (1999) and Pickersgill’s (2009) findings are 
contraindicative of the apparent shift towards a language of ‘destigmatising 
personality disorder’ and its status as a treatable condition (Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005). 
Rather, these studies demonstrate the complexity of experts’ talk and its powerful, 
constitutive effects, such as the construction of personality disorder treatment 
(whether preventative or curative) as both a therapeutic necessity and a professional 
ethical duty. 
 
1.8 Summary and Rationale for Current Research 
 
The history of the construct psychopathy reveals a powerful and long-standing 
discourse: some people are ‘born bad’. A realist perspective on the psychological or 
(neuro)biological characteristics of individuals has been preferred across the 
mainstream literature to date. As Jones (2016) argues, such a focus inevitably 
produces only a thin understanding of a phenomenon which exists in psychological, 
social, physical and cultural realms of human life. Given the prevailing research 
paradigm and the history of the construct, such research foci is understandable 
(Godfrey-Smith, 2000); if psychopathy is understood to be a real-but-unobservable 
fact, the longstanding drive to identify its constituent parts makes sense. However, 
despite prolific research, no common pathology of psychopathy has been identified 
and researchers continue to debate the core features of the construct (Scott, 
Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Miller & Lynam, 2012). 
 
Since the anti-psychiatry movement, individualised, biomedical investigation has 
been criticised for being a mechanism through which culturally troublesome 
behaviour is redefined according to pathological conditions of somatic origin, 
enabling treatment and control from medical authorities (Szasz, 1974). However, 
unlike research in other areas of mental health (e.g. Boyle, 2002), this shift in 
thinking in relation to psychopathy is in its infancy, perhaps pointing to the 
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pervasiveness of the belief that some people are pathologically ‘bad’. Thus far, the 
social component of psychopathy has been poorly investigated, especially with 
regard to how psychopathy is constructed discursively and how this contributes to 
the way individuals with the label are understood. This gap is problematic as 
clinicians and academics recognise that personality disorder diagnoses, including 
psychopathy, offer flawed or limited explanations for complex phenomena (Black, 
1999; Bornstein, 2011; Pilgrim, 2001). Research should therefore seek to widen the 
clinical frame via sociological inquiry, moving away from a focus on randomised 
controlled trial (RCT) investigations, which centre on an individualised diagnostic 
concept (Pilgrim, 2001).  
 
A body of research which closely explores the clinical significance and implications 
of the psychopathy construct from a critical perspective was identified in the 
literature; four of these studies were directly relevant to the present study and were 
briefly outlined. Noting these exceptions, scientific attempts to investigate the 
accounts of professionals on the subject of psychopathy are rare. Moreover, there do 
not appear to have been any investigations into the accounts of clinical psychologists 
working with individuals with psychopathy to date. This is significant given that the 
psychology profession holds status as a key professional group with the skills to 
assess for, and confer the presence of, psychopathy.  
 
Examination of professionals’ talk has proved to be an insightful research endeavour 
in other mental health contexts (e.g. Harper, 1999); the accounts of clinical 
psychologists working with individuals with a label of psychopathy is likely to be 
similarly revealing and significant. Thus, this study aims to explore discourses within 
clinical and psychological constructions of psychopathy by examining clinical 
psychologists’ understandings, including how they construct this knowledge through 
speech acts, and the subjectivities that are produced by their constructions. It is 
likely that competing and contradictory positions will be taken up by the participants; 
an analysis of the functions and interests served by these positions may highlight 




1.9 Research Questions 
 
In light of the above literature review, by examining the discourses of those who use 
and apply a label of psychopathy in their professional lives, the following research 
questions will be addressed:  
 
1. How are professional and wider socio-cultural contexts imbricated in how 
clinical psychologists construct psychopathy? 
2. What discourses are produced through these constructions? 
3. What are the implications of these constructions for clinical psychology 




2 CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHOD 
 
In this chapter, I will outline the epistemological and methodological positions 
adopted in this research, including its central characteristics and assumptions, 
followed by a brief summary of Foucauldian theoretical underpinnings informing the 
chosen approach to discourse analysis. I will then summarise the recruitment and 
interview procedures, as well as the ethical considerations involved in undertaking 
this research. I will summarise the analysis method and offer a rationale for its 
application to the data of the present research. Lastly, I will outline the reflexive 
considerations I sought to apply throughout the research process.  
 
2.1 Epistemological Position 
 
This research draws on a critical realist social constructionist framework (also 
described as ‘moderate social constructionism’) (Harper, 2011). Research in this 
tradition assumes that the types of reality available to us are co-constructed socially 
and through language, and differ according to place and time, which could be said to 
be epistemologically relativist. At the same time, this framework assumes the 
presence of underlying structures and mechanisms which produce phenomena that 
are constructed linguistically in particular ways, thus this position could be described 
as ontologically realist (Parker, 1992). A key assumption of this position is that, as 
individuals, we possess beliefs or claims about our world, based on the accumulation 
of lived experience and intricately tied up with socio-cultural contexts. The presence 
of social rules and standards determines which of these claims about reality are 
authorised as knowledge, meaning that certain claims have more social and cultural 
currency than others, as well as being more or less available to us. Central to the 
critical realist social constructionist argument, therefore, is the presence of an 
interacting and interactive process between individual and society, shaping available 
ways-of-being in the world, as well as what can be claimed as valid knowledge 
(Elder-Vass, 2012).  
 
In relation to research, a critical realist social constructionist framework assumes the 
importance of contextualising talk and attending to the ways in which institutional and 
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material structures (extra-discursive factors) are manifested in individuals’ lived 
experiences. An example of this in the context of the present research might be 
attending to the extra-discursive power of government policy and legislation in 
shaping forensic services and the ‘necessities’ which are upholding this, such as 
security procedures and the use of psychological assessment (Sims-Schouten, 
Riley, & Willig, 2007). In this way, a critical realist constructionist position recognises 
that by exploring relationships between discourse and practice, it is possible to 
locate talk within extra-discursive factors such as materiality, institutional power and 
embodiment (Iosifides, 2011). 
 
A critical realist constructionist position differs from ‘direct realism’, which assumes 
that research data mirror reality and that through investigation, truth about the world 
can be uncovered. It also differs from a ‘radical social constructionist’ position, which 
assumes that discourse constructs reality and, therefore, research should focus 
solely on language as the only directly available source of information (Willig, 2008). 
Some researchers argue that the critical realist social constructionist position leads 
to selectively challenging knowledge claims, whereby analysis only partially 
problematises a phenomenon (Woolgar & Pawluch, 1985) and, more fundamentally, 
that it brings together two epistemologically incompatible positions (Speer, 2007). 
However, proponents of the position emphasise the political nature of research 
practice and argue that by moving beyond the text/talk under analysis, it is possible 
to engage with deeply socio-political and moral aspects of human life, thus adopting 
a more ethical research framework (Edley, 2001; Parker, 1998). 
  
2.2 Methodological Position 
 
There are two main traditions within discourse analysis; Discursive Psychology and 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) (Willig, 2008). The present research adopts 
the latter methodology; this was considered to correspond well with the 
epistemological position, with its starting point that available realities are not directly 
accessible and that interpretation and analysis should seek to move beyond 
language by locating talk within historical, political, cultural and social contexts 
(Harper, 2011). Moreover, by locating analysis within wider discursive practices with 
35 
 
a Foucauldian lens, explicit references to politics and power are enabled (Jager & 
Maier, 2009).  
 
Some of the central assumptions of Foucauldian theory and research will now be 
outlined7. These ideas will be drawn upon in the analysis; although there is no single 
way to perform an FDA (see section 2.5.1), Foucault’s works provide a range of 
ideas- a “tool box” -that a discursive researcher can draw upon (Foucault, 1974, p. 
523).  
 
2.2.1 Discourses and Subject Positions 
Central to Foucauldian theory is the notion of discourse. Discourses can be 
understood as recurrent systems of statements that are used to talk about objects 
and events in the world, which make certain social practices and ways-of-being 
appear more reasonable than others (Parker, 1992). They indicate distinctive ways 
that a phenomenon can be talked about and point to existing limitations in self and 
other construction. In this way, discourses serve as ‘building blocks’ for entire 
institutions (e.g. medicine, law, science) (Edley, 2001). They point to operations of 
power and ways in which individuals are ‘subjectified’; that is, the particular kinds of 
self it is possible to be (Foucault, 1982). This relates to the concepts of positioning or 
subject positions proposed by Harré and colleagues (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & 
Van Langenhove, 1999). Positioning offers an alternative to mainstream notions of 
identity and roles; through positioning, an individual’s speech and action are located 
within particular social categories and this enables or disables particular self-
constructs. For both a speaker and the subject of talk, subject positions are available 
based on the discourses within which they have been located, and the possible roles 
that a person may or may not claim for themselves arise from within these 
discourses (Willig, 2008). 
 
Individuals are naturalised into particular discursive resources and practices, which 
are culturally and historically situated rules for the organisation of social knowledge, 
and which have implications for a person’s subjective experience (Edley, 2001; 
7 Ideas and concepts discussed in this section are structured discreetly, however, readers should note 
that Foucault’s works have aimed to illustrate that power, knowledge and subjectivities (as located in 
discourse) are interconnected (Rabinow, 1991).  
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Willig, 2008). For example, a clinical psychologist might talk about themselves as a 
‘scientist-practitioner’; this discursive practice demonstrates an available subject 
position which has particular effects in the construction of psychological phenomena, 
thus pointing to possibilities of action. Foucauldian discourse analysts would seek to 
examine whose interests are best served through different discursive formations 
(Foucault, 1980).  
 
2.2.2 Knowledge and the Psy-Complex8 
Knowledge, in the Foucauldian sense, has a productive role in shaping the world and 
what is knowable and possible within it (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). 
Foucauldian theory problematises the notion that there is a ‘real’ world whose ‘true’ 
nature can be uncovered, rather it assumes that there are multiple versions which 
are constructed through language and which have social, psychological and physical 
effects; therefore, available ‘truths’ construct and sustain certain forms of human 
social life (Burr, 1995) and shape the possibilities for action within an individual’s 
cultural reference (Fairclough, 1995). For instance, of central concern to the present 
research is knowledges practiced by clinical psychologists, part of the constellation 
of professions prefixed by the term ‘psy’.  
 
Rose (1999, p. x) poses a series of questions in relation to the examination of 
knowledge which make plain the Foucauldian endeavour to produce a history of 
knowledge in the present and, in so doing, question present certainties: “Where do 
objects emerge? Which are the authorities who are able to pronounce upon them? 
Through what concepts and explanatory regimes are they specified? How do certain 
constructions acquire the status of truth?” It is the intention of Foucauldian research 
to answer these questions by investigating the techniques through which psy-
professions generate, circulate and deploy particular knowledges in service of a 
particular version of reality; what might be termed ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault, 1979). 
An example of this process of meaning production might be the use of psychometric 
assessment to legitimate conferring a diagnostic category (e.g. psychopathy) onto an 
individual. In this way, tools such as standardised questionnaires (e.g. the PCL-R), 




                                                          
categorisation systems (e.g. the DSM), and pharmacological and psychological 
interventions, can be seen as ‘technologies’ which produce knowledge or truth that 
becomes ‘common sense’ (Parker, 1997).  
 
The psy-professions are also implicated in the production of binary divisions which 
enable forms of social regulation and control. Pertinent examples of binary divisions 
in the context of the present study are good/evil and mad/sane; truths about what 
constitutes these categories become part of the social fabric, turning surveillance 
practices, such as the “observations of others, supervision and recording of 
movements” (McIntosh, 2002, p. 72), as well as indefinite incarceration and 
indeterminate sentencing, into common-sense practice. In visible and explicit ways, 
technologies of surveillance are routine/integral/constituent in forensic contexts. 
However, surveillance can also be invisible; Bentham’s panopticon prison design, 
where prisoners internalise the disciplinary ‘gaze’, was theorised by Foucault (1991) 
as an example of such internal surveillance processes. Governmental policies about 
the management of problematic individuals (those with personality disorder, for 
example) are other examples of implicit surveillance. 
 
2.2.3 Power 
Following Foucauldian theory, “power and knowledge directly imply one another” and 
are inextricably linked (Foucault, 1991, p. 27). Moreover, power is not a ‘thing’ but is 
understood as existing between people, institutions and other intra-individual 
relationships. As such, power is not something that is owned by the State, and it can 
be seen to be operating at all levels of social relations, from the most proximal/micro 
to the most distal/macro (O’Farrell, 2005). Central in this regard are ‘technologies of 
the self’ and ‘technologies of power’ (Foucault, 1988b). These are practices and 
techniques by which individuals and institutions regulate and govern human conduct. 
These technologies orient towards an objectification of the body as a site of 
production and subjection (Rabinow, 1991), with the aim of making bodies ‘docile’ 
(Foucault, 1991). ‘Biopower’ is an example of a technology of power, whereby 
medical and political domains are linked through their use of the human body 
(McIntosh, 2002; Nilsson & Wallenstein, 2013; Peckover, 2002). This is of particular 
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relevance to the present study; the psychopath, as a deviant kind, is constructed 
between psychiatric and legal institutions. 
 
With these ideas in mind, Foucauldian research is especially concerned with the 
networks, strategies and techniques by which knowledge is formed and decisions 
are accepted; what Foucault (1990, p. 102) described as “mechanisms of power”. 
Non-discursive practices are also implicated in this production process; they refer to 
the “institutions, political events, economic practices and processes” involved in the 
reproduction of power (Foucault, 1969, p. 162). This process of state sanctioned 
knowledge-production and dissemination, and enforcement of socially acceptable 
behaviours, as well as the corresponding production, dissemination and enforcement 
of sanctionable behaviours, is termed ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 2007). At the 
same time, power has both a repressive and a productive capacity, and can fluctuate 
according to shifting alliances and dialogues (Parker, 1992). Thus, resistance in the 
form of counter-discourses (voicing alternative truths) are possible within talk. More 
than this, according to Foucault (1980), resistance is an essential component of the 
functioning of power, meaning that non-dominant discourse produces knowledge 
which undermines accepted truth claims and points to alternative positions and 
ways-of-being, thus making different social practices possible. An example of this is 
the Hearing Voices Network, which provides a powerful counterpoint to the prevailing 
knowledge that individuals who hear things others do not are unwell and need to be 
cured, typically through pharmacological interventions (Romme & Escher, 1993). 
 
2.2.4 Rationale for Using FDA  
In line with Hacking (2007; 2006), the psychopath has long been constructed as a 
human kind. More than this, the psychopath is an object through which multiple 
institutions intersect (medicine, psychology, law, government). The literature base 
reveals a shared belief in the construct across the ‘mainstream’ of these professions, 
but a concurrent and longstanding doubt is also revealed to run alongside this. Thus, 
there are tensions within the available discourses relating to psychopathy. By 
utilising a Foucauldian approach, it is possible to explore how the concept is 
understood, the ways in which language is used to construct these understandings, 
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the structural and material factors out of which these constructions are made 
possible and reinforcing, and the proximal and distal implications of this talk.  
 
Limitations of FDA should be acknowledged; in seeking to comment on wider non-
discursive, material practices and overtly moving away from consideration of the 
interactional context, FDA has been criticised as failing to attend to micro ‘in text’ 
issues and of imposing intellectual preoccupations onto practice (Schegloff, 1997). 
Moreover, the absence of a standardised methodological process means that 
Foucauldian researchers are at greater potential risk of analytic shortcomings when 
engaging with textual data (Antaki, Billig, & Edwards, 2004). Given this, I have 
sought to ground the analytical process in the methodological literature (Willig, 
2008).  
 
Other methodological approaches were considered. Most notably, a Discursive 
Psychology approach could be appropriately applied to the same dataset but would 
focus analytical attention on locally organised discursive practices, such as 
interpretive repertoires and rhetorical devices (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Through 
this methodological approach, micro-level interactions are attended to in order to 
understand how stake, accountability and interest are managed by participants, such 
as through patterns of speech which position accounts as natural or unproblematic 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992). An example of this is “category entitlement”, which draws 
attention to a speaker’s group membership for the purposes of legitimising a claim 
(“as a psychologist, I would say they seemed psychopathic”). However, this 
approach has been criticised for its failure to attend to macro-level socio-political 
power relations (Wetherell, 1998), which are central to the aims of this research. 
Significantly, through engagement with an additional layer of analysis and 
interpretation, beyond the speech acts of participants, discourse and practice are 
linked, with the consequential possibility of identifying alternative positions, leading to 
alternative social practices. This is of particular importance to the present research 
given that people identified as psychopathic are portrayed as ‘other’ and experience 
considerable social inequalities, demonstrated throughout Chapter One.  
 
Moreover, this research is underpinned by an epistemological position which 
recognises that power/knowledge constellations of the psy-professions enable 
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certain things to be constructed as true via particular discursive constructions and 
related practices. It has been argued that psychopathy is one such construction, and 
that clinical psychology is a central figure in its reproduction. Thus, an FDA of the 
multiple ways clinical psychologists talk about and use the concept of psychopathy is 
an important endeavour. In interviewing only clinical psychologists this research 
seeks to attend to the continuities and discontinuities in how psychopathy is talked 
about by an invested and dominant professional group, and to attend to the dynamic 
constitution and reconstitution of manifold and contradictory discourse practices 
(Davies & Harré, 1990). This may also enable the identification of counter-discourses 




2.3.1 Ethical Considerations 
 
2.3.1.1 Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval was sought and granted at School and University levels 
(Appendices A and B). The project was also registered and authorised on the 
Integrated Research Application System (IRAS) in order to obtain NHS Permission, 
due to recent changes to processes around recruiting NHS staff as research 
participants (Appendix C). Following this, three NHS Trust Research and 
Development (R&D) departments were contacted for ethical approval (Appendices 
D-F). No issues arose from these processes.  
 
Of note, the original proposal outlined focus groups as the preferential data source. 
However, following informal consultation with senior clinical psychologists, interviews 
were identified as the preferred mode of data collection due to anticipated logistical 
difficulties in requiring potential participants to be available at a shared time. The 




2.3.1.2 Participants’ Rights 
Informed consent was sought prior to conducting data collection (Appendix G). In 
concordance with the research method, it was not possible for participants to be 
aware of the information they might disclose prior to the interviews. Therefore, upon 
completion, participants were asked to reconfirm their initial consent to participation 
in order to truly ensure informed consent. Participants were informed of their right to 
withdraw from the research at any time. They were also advised that, should they 
wish for something discussed during the interview to be omitted from the 
transcription at a later date, this would be accommodated without issue. None of the 
participants have requested that the interview transcriptions be amended in any way.  
 
All names, service locations, and other identifying information has been anonymised. 
All data were stored on an encrypted USB stick. 
 
2.3.2 Recruitment 
A purposeful sampling method was utilised, meaning that the sample for the 
research was targeted to meet the needs of the research questions. An information 
sheet (Appendix H) was sent to the psychology leads of forensic services within R&D 
approved Trusts, to be distributed to the staff. One service requested a presentation 
at a team meeting, which was facilitated.  
 
The research inclusion criteria specified Health & Care Professions Council (HCPC) 
registered clinical psychologists currently working in forensic services and in contact 
with service users identified as psychopathic. No age, gender, ethnicity or religious 
restrictions were applied to recruitment. One participant was excluded from the 
research on the basis that they had never worked with anyone ascribed a label of 




Eight participants were interviewed in total. Georgaca and Avdi (2012) recommend 
that a minimum of six participants be recruited for interview data in order to achieve 
theoretical saturation; this is the point at which enough data have been gathered to 
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allow for a repetitious and in-depth process of analysis, leading to a point at which no 
new data appear and all theoretical concepts are well developed (Morse, 2003). 
 
Three participants were male, five were female. All participants were between the 
ages of 30 and 50 and identified as White British. Participants were working across 
low (3), medium (4) and high (1) secure NHS forensic services. Participants reported 
predominantly working in forensic settings since qualifying as clinical psychologists. 
Though no minimum time since qualification was stipulated, the most ‘junior’ clinical 
psychologist recruited had been working in forensic services for three years. 
Participants received their Doctoral Degrees from a variety of university institutions 
across the UK.  
 
2.4 Data Collection 
 
2.4.1 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were the chosen mode of data collection. As noted in the 
original proposal, naturally occurring talk, such as that produced in focus groups, is 
considered to be the optimal data source for discursive research. This is because it 
is most likely to provide a context from which the construction of discourses can be 
examined through a conversational, ‘natural’ interaction amongst participants, whilst 
also providing a structure in which to contain discussions on contentious topics 
(Willig, 2008). However, focus groups were considered to be logistically problematic 
from a service management perspective, meaning that it was necessary to collect 
data via semi-structured interviews (see section 2.3.1.1). Significantly, adopting an 
individual interview method allowed for the collection of data from ‘lone’ respondents 
(i.e. no one else in their service expressed interest), meaning that the dataset 
represents a variety of clinical psychologists working across multiple settings and 
levels of security and, therefore, cannot be said to be ‘service-specific’. Five 
interviews took place on NHS sites at the interviewees’ place of work. Two interviews 
were held at private locations because participants were on annual or maternity 





A semi-structured interview guide (Appendix I) was developed in order to facilitate 
the interview process and to ensure a degree of uniformity in the topics covered 
during each interview. This was developed in reference to the literature and in 
collaboration with my Director of Studies. A pilot interview to test the efficacy of the 
interview guide was not possible due to difficulties with recruiting participants. 
However, due to the protracted recruitment process, earlier interviews were 
transcribed prior to later interviews taking place, meaning that a natural process of 
reflection and development in relation to the interview guide did occur. For instance, I 
became aware that the use of words such as ‘difficult’ and ‘support’ imply a 
problematic nature to psychopathy, which would potentially influence the direction of 
participants’ talk. Consequently, at later interviews, I sought to adopt language used 
by the participants themselves, rather than offering particular descriptions 
unsolicited. Moreover, I recognise that an interviewer’s questions are vital in the 
production of interviewees’ accounts, and that my own subjectivities will have 
informed consequent talk (Baker, 1997). For instance, I am aware that my use of 
leading questions at times informed the content of the consequent conversation; this 
is a potential limitation of the study and, in order to ensure transparency, I have 
sought to be explicit about these dyadic features of discursive constructions 
throughout the written analysis. A reflective, conversational style was used 
throughout, in order to facilitate a comfortable space where rich data could be 
gathered (Smith, 2008). Broadly speaking, the interviewees were asked to talk about 
how they understood the concept of psychopathy, their experiences of working with 
this identified group, their thoughts on the impact of the label and related 
assessment processes on themselves, the individuals assigned the label, and the 
systems in which they practice.  
 
2.4.2 Transcription  
Eight participants produced a total of 435.7 minutes of data ( x = 54.46; range = 
48.18–65.86). Interviews were digitally recorded and then transcribed verbatim using 
a Jefferson-lite approach (Banister et al., 2011); see Appendix K for transcription 
conventions. I transcribed all data. This simple framework was considered most 
appropriate for the nature of the analysis, which focussed on broad discursive 
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practices rather than proximal speech features (e.g. gestures). Once transcribed, the 




2.5.1 ‘Doing’ Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
As Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008) state, there is no ‘right’ way to ‘do’ FDA, no 
single set of techniques to be utilised by the researcher. Instead, there are a range of 
Foucauldian ideas which the researcher can apply to a discourse analysis depending 
on their research aims (see section 2.2). Moreover, the irony inherent in seeking to 
apply a rigid formula for ‘doing’ FDA must be acknowledged; this is anathema to 
Foucault’s theses and his ideas about ‘technologies of domination’ are applicable 
here (Foucault, 1991). Several commentators have noted the artificiality of such 
distinct fault lines between the two traditions of discourse analysis, arguing that their 
respective analytical foci overlap (Potter & Wetherell, 1995; Willig, 2008). 
Nonetheless, as a novice researcher, I closely consulted guidelines for performing 
an FDA. One possible way of approaching FDA research is offered by Willig (2008). 
She outlines six stages to the process, though emphasises that these are non-linear: 
 
• Stage one consists of identifying the ‘discursive object’ and the way it is being 
constructed within the text. Willig emphasises that attention should be paid to 
both implicit and explicit references, as well as what is not being said.  
 
• Stage two consists of identification of discourses, which means locating the 
various constructions of the discursive object within wider discourse 
frameworks; for example, a biomedical discourse.  
 
• Stage three consists of investigating the action orientation of the different 
discourses by exploring when and how they are utilised in the text. She 
recommends asking “What is gained from constructing the object in this 
particular way at this particular point in the text? What is its function and how 
does it relate to other constructions produced in the surrounding text?” (p. 
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116). The answers may point to ways in which a particular discourse justifies 
certain practices.  
 
• Stage four consists of identifying available subject positions, which are the 
‘discursive locations’ from which individuals can speak and act. Willig notes 
that subject positions implied by different discourses can either be taken up or 
resisted and both responses have implications.  
 
• Stage five consists of consideration of opportunity for practice; that is, what 
actions (both productive and restrictive) follow from particular discourses.  
 
• Stage six consists of exploring the relationship between discourses and 
subjectivities, thus considering what are the possible ‘realities’ given the 
available discourses and their arising subject positions.  
 
Across multiple readings of the dataset, these features were investigated; discursive 
constructions (Appendix L) and subject positions (Appendix M), including possible 
practices and discourses, were identified and categorised. Holding in mind the 
research questions, further readings resulted in the identification of overarching 
constructions and subjectivities occurring across the dataset, into which initial 
themes were assimilated; these provided a data-driven structure for the analysis 
write-up. At all analytical stages, when engaging with the data, I used a pencil to 
mark the original transcripts; for auditing purposes, examples of annotated 
transcripts are reported in Appendices N-P. The final stage of the analysis involved 
transforming my note-form analysis into fully-formed text; this necessitated further 
clarification of analytical work and reengaging with the wider literature. This 
extensive process has meant that several layers of Foucauldian-informed analysis 
were conducted on the data, resulting in an empirically robust9 analytical process.  
 
  
9 In the sense that the results of the present research aim to contribute to theory-building within the 
social sciences through a methodologically rigorous approach (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1998). 
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2.6 Reflexivity 
 
As Parker (1994) highlights, different researchers necessarily interpret different 
results dependent on their context and the meanings they attribute and, therefore, 
the influence of the researcher can be felt at all levels of the research process. In this 
way, researcher bias is an inevitable feature of qualitative research (Parker, 1999). 
Thus, any qualitative analysis, including this one, is necessarily equivocal; even 
Foucault (1969) observed that his own analysis was deliberately limited. Reflexivity 
is an essential part of quality-evaluation in research (Fossey, Harvey, Mcdermott, & 
Davidson, 2002). Through the process of reflexivity a researcher can attempt to 
contextualise the ‘regime of truth’ they are constructing through their research 
(O’Farrell, 2005). Thus, from the beginning of this process, as well as at each of the 
research stages, I have sought to examine that which I am both drawn to and 
avoidant of when engaging with the data in order to remain alive to the limitations of 
the knowledge claims I make.  
 
For instance, by adopting a critical stance towards the psychopathy construct, I am 
positioned and position myself in particular ways (Willig, 2009). I am aware that 
throughout the interview process I took up multiple contradictory positions, in order to 
probe and elaborate participants’ accounts, and to make sense of what was being 
said. Simultaneously, I was conscious that the process of being interviewed could be 
experienced by interviewees as though their opinions and practices in relation to 
psychopathy were under scrutiny, leading to a modification in my questions and 
responses.  
 
In addition, as a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of East London, I have 
been influenced by teaching which privileges a critical framework towards the 
practice of psychology and the knowledges produced by the wider profession; as 
such I aligned with a critical perspective towards the construct of psychopathy. At the 
same time, previous experiences of forensic services and familiarity with the 
practices therein have naturalised me to the various assumptions of a forensic 
context; the consequent ease with which I ‘slipped’ into reproducing prevailing 
knowledges about constructs like personality disorder and psychopathy was 
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therefore a potential source of tension within the present research. It is also possible 
that my preference for a critical stance towards mainstream clinical psychology 
practice, combined with previous experiences of working in forensic psychology 
settings, contributed to my decision to investigate clinical psychologists’ talk about 
psychopathy. This potential bias was balanced by the fact that psychologists in 
forensic settings are the most likely professional group to conduct psychopathy 
assessments, rather than psychiatrists or nurses. Thus they hold an expert position 
in relation to the construct, making them a preferential research population for this 
study.  
 
A reflexive review of other issues arising throughout the reflexivity process is offered 




3 CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter I offer an analysis of interviews conducted with eight clinical 
psychologists working across secure forensic services. I will present an analysis of 
the discursive constructions of psychopathy, followed by an analysis of related 
professional subjectivities. An examination of available discourses, their implications 
and uses will occur throughout. Attention will then shift to an exploration of the 
practices and positions implied through this talk for clinical psychology and forensic 
services. Foucauldian theory will be utilised throughout the analysis in line with the 
research methodology and extracts will be used to evidence analytical work.  
 
3.1 Theoretical Assumptions of the Analysis 
Several related and interlinking themes were indicated across participants’ talk, with 
variations arising via a number of culturally available discourses. While the analysis 
will at times refer to the frequency with which these types of talk occurred, it should 
be noted that this is of less importance within this form of analysis than examination 
of their availability and possible function. Additionally, theoretical underpinnings of 
this research recognise that analyses have a ‘position’ and, therefore, the present 
analysis offers one of a possible many readings of the data. As such, this research 
can be said to be culturally located and thus does not describe an irrefutable 
statement on clinical psychologists’ constructions of psychopathy (Van Dijk, 2011). It 
should also be emphasised that the structure of this chapter implies a distinction 
across and between features of participants’ talk; this is artificial given their co-
occurrence across the dataset. 
 
3.2 Constructing the Psychopath10: A Uniquely Problematic Individual 
Participants constructed individuals with psychopathy as problematic in a variety of 
ways. Talk arose from recurring variations of hegemonic discourses; ‘at risk’ and 
‘trauma’ discourses were utilised across participants’ discursive constructions, 
arising from overarching biomedical and biopsychosocial discourses to explain the 
10 To reemphasise, ‘psychopath’ is a conceptually problematic term; its use here intends to reflect the 
concept under construction between the interviewer and interviewee, as per the research questions. 
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aetiology of psychopathy. Additionally, a discourse of ‘intuition’ was used to describe 
ways in which psychopathy can be identified, sitting alongside descriptions of 
elusiveness (“slippery”, “misunderstood”), so constructing psychopathy as a form of 
expert, specialist knowledge. Most frequently, constructions aligned with prevailing 
knowledges about psychopaths as ‘bad’, identifiable according to particular negative 
behaviours or characteristics. Participants’ talk drew on language from the PCL-R 
and contemporary psychopathy research (“lack of empathy”, “cold-callous”, 
“manipulative”), thus biomedical, diagnostic and scientific discourses were prevalent 
across this discursive site.  
 
Participants also produced an alternative construction, whereby individuals with 
psychopathy were constructed as psychologically damaged (i.e. ‘mad’); this 
discursive construction was articulable via psychological concepts and theory arising 
from a biopsychosocial discourse. Constructions presented in this discursive site 
were the closest participants came to articulating a counter-discourse of 
psychopathy. From here, psychology-specific technologies (e.g. formulation) were 
positioned as mechanisms through which a richer, less stigmatised understanding 
would be possible. Thus, through this discursive construction, participants attempted 
to re-produce11 (rather than reproduce) notions of psychopathy from within the 
structures of wider psy-complex power/knowledges.   
 
Implicit across these discursive constructions was an assumption of behavioural 
‘norms’, demonstrated via recurrent employment of comparison to other forensic 
service users and, at times, to the wider population. According to these parameters, 
a service user’s behaviour was constituted as either a.) acceptable, b.) 
comprehensible given contextual factors, or c.) incomprehensible and deviant. In line 
with Hacking (2006), implicit (de)values were assigned to individuals with 
psychopathy according to the degree to which they deviated from these norming 
parameters.  
 
11 ‘Re-produce’ indicates a possible transforming process to these arrangements; ‘reproduce’ 
indicates pre-existing power/knowledge constellations (Moynihan, 2015; Shukaitis & Graeber, 2007). 
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Four overarching discursive constructions resonant with understandings of the label 
(e.g. Hare, 2003; Schimmenti et al., 2014) were identified across participants’ 
accounts: dangerous, challenging, manipulative and psychologically damaged. 
 
3.2.1 Dangerous 
The psychopath was constructed as dangerous in a variety of ways: to more 
vulnerable service users; to staff, both physically and psychologically; to society at 
large. The prevailing sense was that psychopaths are responsible for a 
disproportionate amount of distress and difficulty in forensic settings, despite their 
rarity; this knowledge is in keeping with prevailing messages about psychopathy and 
aligns with wider extra-discursive practices, such as the Dangerous and Severe 
Personality Disorders governmental initiative (Duggan, 2011). In making sense of the 
psychopath as uniquely dangerous, this discursive construction is part of a 
framework which legitimises the need to incarcerate and contain. In the following 
extract, this sense of dangerousness is produced through multiple mechanisms: (1) 
emphasising that psychopathy is ‘more than’ APD; (2) emphasising that a person 
with psychopathy ‘feels’ different to all others; (3) articulating a need for ‘intuition’, 
implying that psychopathy is difficult to predict and foresee: 
 
Extract 1 (Alistair: 150-172)  
Kitty: so one of the things you were talking about earlier was, you were 
talking about APD as well as psychopathy, […]12 what’s your sense of 
where psychopathy and APD merge? (.) or are they just the same 
thing?  
 
Alistair: No they’re not, I don’t think they’re the same thing. I think 
we’ve got lots of antisocial people here but not many psychopaths, if 
you wanna call it that, but it’s a subset I think of APD. Erm (.) so you 
know if you look at the PCL assessment, half of it is basically antisocial 
PD you know, have they done all these things in the past that tick the 
box, (.) erm but then you’ve got that sort of feeling, I mean it’s kind of a- 
it’s a bit of intuition and experience I suppose, and working out who you 
12 Denotes text omitted for brevity. For transparency, omitted text is reported in Appendix Q. 
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would score highly I think, but it’s very much the sort of charismatic (.) 
<K: mm> you know lying, real sort of lack of empathy type of err type of 
people you know who are high PCL scorers, and antisocial (.) is maybe 
a bit more about erm I suppose both are to do with early circumstances 
but I think (.) you can put anyone into kind of really difficult situations 
and they might end up with antisocial PD, I think it takes (.) specific 
people to <K: mm> end up with sort of high PCL scores I think. (.) It’s a 
small subset I’d say.  
 
Alistair draws on a number of discourses in this construction of psychopathy; he 
takes up my question, including the diagnostic and psychiatric categories within it, to 
emphasise that APD and psychopathy are separate but related to one another, with 
APD constructed as comparatively commonplace across forensic settings. He 
legitimises this knowledge by calling upon the PCL-R as an objective diagnostic 
practice, so privileging associated biomedical assumptions of individualism and 
internal pathology. Thus, psychopathy is constructed as something rare but clinically 
identifiable.  
 
Alistair draws on ‘intuition’ talk to exemplify psychopathy’s distinctness. This was a 
common discursive mechanism across the dataset; its effect is to move possible 
constructions of the psychopath away from, or beyond, psychological assessment 
processes and nosological features, into a mythical, non-scientific space, whereby 
reliance on subjective, undefinable ‘feelings’ are legitimate means for the 
identification of psychopathy. Previous research into the mythologic tendency of 
professionals’ accounts of psychopathy is resonant here (Hamilton, 2008). One 
possible consequence of this talk is that Alistair is positioned away from a status of 
scientist-practitioner, producing clinical experience and ‘gut-feeling’ as useful forms 
of knowledge. Clinical judgement (the scientification of intuition) is a legitimate psy-
practice in assessment processes such as the PCL-R; Alistair’s talk is locatable 
here. Instinct talk means that the subsequent construction of the psychopath as 
deceitfully charming- a ‘classic’ characterisation of the psychopath- does not require 
legitimation by objective means; as with all ‘folk devils’, the deviance of the 





In accordance with mainstream research, the construct of empathy is identified as a 
central feature of psychopathy. Empathy is a concept within the purview of 
professional psychology and an example of a lay term which has been increasingly 
co-opted by the psy-professions as technical language (e.g. its inclusion on the PCL-
R). By subsuming lay descriptions into professional terminology, asymmetric power 
relations are maintained and individuals with psychopathy are reproduced as sites 
for psychological attention and state intervention. The scientific value of diagnostic 
systems (DSM and PCL-R) are emphasised here in their ability to distinguish 
differing psychopathologies; in accordance with contemporary debates, psychopathy 
is constructed as a ‘special’ subset of APD (Coid & Ullrich, 2010; Skeem et al., 
2011). 
 
Alistair then emphasises different aspects of a biopsychosocial model to construct 
both APD and psychopathy as contrasting psychopathologies; while both are 
acknowledged as arising in part from “early circumstances”, a (bio)psychosocial 
discourse constructs APD as a natural response by “anyone” in extreme 
circumstances, whereas a bio(psychosocial) discourse constructs individuals with 
psychopathy as having a predisposing vulnerability to developing the disorder. The 
practical implication of these constructions is that the behaviours of some individuals 
are difficult to comprehend without the use of the psychopathy label. Through such 
talk, the PCL-R and the psychopathy label are established as useful clinical tools for 
making sense of otherwise nonsensical behaviours, and for validating professionals’ 
emotional responses. Most significantly, it is demonstrative of the self-fulfilling 
double-bind of psychopathy in action, previously noted in the theoretical literature 
(e.g. Pilgrim, 2001).  
 
Alistair is then asked whether he thinks other professional groups would have a 
sense of the intuition (“flavour”) for psychopathy. He responds:  
 
Extract 2  (Alistair: 190-201) 
(.) Not sure. I think its bandied about very easily the sort of label of 
psychopathy erm (.) errrrrrrrm no, I don’t think there is that sort of real 
good sort of awareness. I think I think that the training helps er to give 
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you that sense of what’s antisocial and what’s psychopathy <K: 
mhmm> erm but people get called psychopaths all the time when 
they’re not, (LG) maybe because they’re a child sex offender or 
something like that, but it’s just because they’ve done something really 
nasty they think ‘oh they must be a psychopath’, but you know, not 
necessarily.  
 
Others’ responses are constructed as grounded in a ‘lay’ theory of psychopathy (Link 
& Phelan, 2001). This is offered as an implied explanation for why individuals with 
psychopathy are stigmatised, and is separated off from a more informed, clinical 
theory (McPhail, 2013). By emphasising that psychopathy is a term often misused 
and misapplied by others, clinical intuition is constituted as a form of technical 
knowledge which can be owned and used by a select few specialists (Federman et 
al., 2009). Thus, the construction of psychopathy as something dangerously illusive 
enables clinical psychology to position itself as having specialist knowledge and 
skills in the identification and use of the psychopathy label, as well as to train others 
in this ‘awareness’. In this way, Alistair takes up an expert subjectivity (see section 
3.3.3) and an effect of this is to make essential forms of practice which extend 
psychology’s remit beyond the therapy room. By constructing psychopathy as 
something that is misused, confusing and requiring expertise, interventions such as 
shared team formulations and reflective practices become vital (see sections 3.4.1 
and 3.4.2). Here, and across the dataset, a process of pastoral power is apparent 
whereby staff can be transformed into better practitioners through an increase in 
their ability to understand psychopathologies from a psychological perspective 
(Foucault, 1982).  
 
Accounts of psychopathy retain a folkloric status and, as this extract demonstrates, 
professionals’ talk is implicated in the proliferation of psychopathy’s position as a 
long-standing moral panic (Cohen, 2002). This talk is not dissimilar to academics 
and researchers calling upon stories such as Cain and Abel as evidence for the 
ubiquitous existence of the psychopath cross-culturally and throughout history (e.g. 
Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011; Mackenzie, 2014). In constructing psychopathy in this way, 





Participants constructed psychopathy as extremely challenging for staff teams to 
manage. Psychological language of ‘splitting’ and ‘boundaries’ was routinely called 
upon in this construction, suggesting that these terms have particular cultural 
valence within forensic contexts and pointing to a reification of metaphorical 
constructs (Lakoff & Johnson, 1997; Szasz, 1973). Several participants expressed 
ambivalence about the psychopathy concept; prior to the extract below, Evelyn 
described being “critical of the concept”. Notably then, the ‘challenging’ construction 
is utilised by participants to manage this ambivalence; through it, the label is 
presented as necessary and helpful within forensic contexts. Thus, participants 
adopted a distal critical position towards psychopathy, by identifying problems at a 
theoretical level, and conjoined (or negated) this with a proximal realist position, by 
constructing psychopathy as a useful and meaningful concept for day-to-day 
working: 
 
Extract 3  (Evelyn: 269-295) 
Evelyn: There’s probably only (.) a couple of people that I can think of 
really clearly where it’s been a very very (.) predominant kind of (.) 
feature of their presentation or you know something that we’ve really (.) 
used as- by way of explanation for them. 
 
Kitty: and what were those- what was what was that like? <E: erm> 
what happened? 
 
Evelyn: (2) I think I think I quite enjoy working with people sometimes 
that are less (.) less psychotic in some ways and more (.) kind of (.) you 
know more of a personality presentation. I think you often have to think 
much more about the dynamics in the therapeutic relationship and as a 
psychologist you often feel like you have to- they’re the people I use 
supervision more for, if that makes sense. Thinking about difficulties, 
you feel like boundaries are often pushed more erm (.) you know kind 
of often they’re the people that (.) the team struggles more with like 
nursing staff and things, you might be thinking about how to work with 
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them directly, and support (.) nursing staff from kind of barriers 
constantly being (.) pushed and maybe teams feel like they’re being 
split and (.) you know people are told different things and you know 
kind of you know er (.) lying or telling fibs is a quite predominant feature 
and can be quite hard to manage in a team erm when people are sort 
of told different things and played in different ways (LG) and I think 
psychology can have a real use in that kind of like (.) you know, as sort 
of overall consultation and and sort of leadership role.  
 
Evelyn begins by framing the additional challenge posed by the psychopath as an 
exciting alternative to other work, recruiting clinical language and mental 
illness/personality disorder distinctions into this construction. As in extract 1, 
psychopathy is constructed as a rare and unusual phenomenon, with the label used 
by staff as an explanation for an otherwise incomprehensible individual. Through this 
discursive construction high levels of supervision are framed as necessary, further 
reinforcing the construction of psychopathy as professionally challenging. 
Supervision constitutes a form of surveillance (a technology of power) whereby self-
knowledge, insight and performance is monitored; Evelyn’s active use of supervision 
indicates that surveillance practices are internalised and self-regulated (Foucault, 
1988b). In this way, a process of docile-utility is operant, which serves to reproduce 
a neoliberal subjectivity, out of which Evelyn is individually responsible for the 
‘problem’ of her emotional responses and self-insight (Gilbert, 2001). Thus, the 
supervisory relationship is a site for an economic transaction, through which 
emotions are regulated (professionalised) and productivity is maintained (Oksala, 
2013).  
 
Evelyn describes the nature of the challenge presented by individuals with 
psychopathy, utilising metaphors of boundaries and splitting; both are concepts 
within the particular purview of professional psychology, drawn from psychodynamic 
discourse (Bridges, 1999; Deacon, 2004; Yakeley & Adshead, 2013). As in extract 1, 
the challenge posed by the psychopath is described using technical knowledge, 
enabling a role for psychology in its explication and governance. Moreover, an effect 
of technical knowledge like this is to construe the object phenomenon as neutral and 
objective, a central ontological tenet of neoliberalism (Oksala, 2013). The effect of 
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this is to define psychopathy as a politically neutral truth, and psychology as a 
politically neutral truth-teller.  
 
Evelyn describes ways in which the team “struggles” in relation to individuals 
identified as psychopathic; most notably, dishonesty and misinformation are central 
to this struggle, a description which aligns with wider available constructions of 
psychopathy in forensic settings and legitimises priorities of management rather than 
therapy strategies (Bowen & Mason, 2012; Mason, Caulfield, et al., 2010; Mason, 
Hall, et al., 2010; Parker et al., 1995). Structures of biopower imbedded in forensic 
psychiatric practices are apparent here; forensic institutions- a crossroads between 
medicine, government and law- render the containment of some individuals by other 
individuals essential. Behaviours constituted as challenging (e.g. “telling fibs”) are 
institutionally deviant and, therefore, they should be managed distally, through extra-
discursive structures (i.e. secure facilities), and proximally, through consultation and 
leadership from knowledgeable psy-professionals. Thus, the constitutive and 
reinforcing relationship between a body (the psychopath), a collective (psy-
professions) and institutions (medicine, government) is illustrated in the discursive 
construction of psychopathy as challenging (Lemke, 2013).  
 
3.2.3 Manipulative  
As in previous literature, another recurring construction of psychopathy across 
participants’ talk was an individual identifiable by their capacity to manipulate others 
(Blais & Forth, 2014; Richman et al., 1999); related terms used were deceitful, 
dishonest, scheming, slippery, duplicitous and devious. This construction is in 
keeping with dominant depictions throughout the wider literature, which signify the 
psychopath as deviant or ‘bad’ (e.g. Berg et al., 2015; Hare, 1999; Schaich Borg et 
al., 2013). The concept ‘manipulative’ is another lay term which has been 
appropriated by psy-professionals and imbued with a status of scientific, objective 
trait; its inclusion on the PCL-R is evidence of this process of language co-option: 
 
Extract 4  (Fred: 474-507) 
Kitty: I wondered er if you could say a little bit more about what are the 
particular difficulties of working with this client group? 
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 Fred: I think er feeling as though you’re being kind of manipulated, erm 
(2) sometimes erm (.) people can be quite skilled- but the thing the 
thing about kind of manipulation (.) is err I think it’s quite unsettling, 
because whereas people with other personality disorders you can feel 
as though you’re being manipulated, (.) it- you- it’s more kind of easily 
understandable, and it’s almost- you put it in the frame of (.) er the life 
that they’ve been through, so you can see the lens by which the person 
is in- interpreting you and trying to move in a in a certain kind of 
direction or- yeah. Whereas with kind of- with people er with 
psychopathy, it’s almost like you don’t know the the reason for which 
they’re doing it in that way and sometimes it can just be in order to 
manipulate you, because that’s one of their kind of their their strengths 
(.) so you don’t necessarily see the kind of the reason why somebody’s 
pushing or pulling you in a in a certain direction (2) erm (2) yeah er and 
well it’s also I think gives you a real sense of feeling ill at ease erm and 
and unsafe, because you’re not- it’s it’s almost like it’s excavating the 
ground from beneath your feet, kind of thing. Erm with other people, 
you can more quickly get on to ground (.) where you’re working on 
common goals together (.) er whereas the you know the ground kind 
of shifts er with people with psychopathy (.) erm yeah and very often 
because they don’t they don’t even view kind of what they’re like as a 
problem in that way, or or as a negative and often you might not be all 
that certain (LG) about the- you know the collection of different traits 
that you’re working with. If you’re not clear about the concept, which 
lots of people aren’t, then you find that you’re either using the label in a 
very black and white way, which doesn’t help you or you don’t know 
that that much about it and you’re slipping about all over the place, 
without having, you know, anchor points kind of for yourself (.) and you 
can’t you can’t use the other person as as as an anchor in a similar 
kind of way.  
 
My question explicitly positions individuals with psychopathy as “difficult”. Fred takes 
up this positioning with a construction underpinned by a diagnostic discourse; in 
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particular he draws on the language of the PCL-R (Hare, 2003). At the same time, 
Fred utilises intuition talk to describe “a feeling” of manipulation. As in extracts 1 and 
3, the behaviours of, and emotional responses towards, individuals with psychopathy 
are constructed as incomprehensible. This is reinforced by a concurrent construction 
of other ‘kinds’ of service user, whose violence or damaging behaviours are 
comprehensible in the context of their diagnoses and histories (Hacking, 
2007). Hence, a unique form of manipulation is assigned to the psychopath, one that 
is especially inexplicable and alarming. Language of “corruption of morals” is present 
here (Foucault, 1991, p. 77) out of which a ‘relational spectrum’ of deviancy is 
constructed, whereby the extent of an individual’s deviance is measurable according 
to the extent of professionals’ discomfort. Out of this construction, the label of 
psychopathy is positioned as a meaningful explanation for both an individual’s 
behaviours and a professional’s feelings. In so doing, a mutually reinforcing 
surveillance process is in action, requiring psy-professionals to engage in self-
regulatory monitoring and formulation of their own internal emotional responses. 
 
Throughout this extract, Fred employs an extended metaphor of being on unstable 
ground to describe the quality of his experience. Through this, the psychopath is 
constructed as disruptive and powerful with a corresponding subject position of 
vulnerability and professional instability. This construction necessitates introspection 
on the part of the clinical psychologist, a practice belonging to a cognitive psy-model; 
thus, evaluation of one’s internal states in-vivo becomes part of the sense-making 
process. The metaphor and comparative construction are simultaneously extended, 
serving to emphasise the unique challenge that individuals with psychopathy pose to 
the therapeutic endeavour, as compared to other service users. From this position, 
Fred establishes specialist knowledge about psychopathy as essential for preventing 
therapeutic uncertainty and misuse of the label through oversimplification. In this 
way, knowledge of psychopathy and self-knowledge are constructed as valuable 
safeguards, uniquely essential when working with psychopaths due to their 
manipulative nature. This is resonant with underlying messages in much the 
contemporary literature, which emphasise that identification and awareness of 
psychopathy are vital clinical assets in forensic systems (e.g. Hare et al., 2000; 
Loving, 2002). Thus, Fred conceptualises his experience of, and responses to, the 
psychopath in line with pre-existing psychological knowledges; his construction and 
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understanding both depend on and propagate available discourses relating to 
psychopathy (diagnostic/intuition) and to self-reflection (of cognitions and feelings). A 
theory-laden process of observation is therefore in action (Kuhn, 1970). 
 
3.2.4 Psychologically Damaged 
Individuals were constructed as vulnerable figures who are psychologically 
damaged, possibly not in control of, or responsible for, their actions. Various 
psychology theories were drawn on in this talk. A tension was present in the 
construction; participants drew on ‘trauma’ discourses (e.g. Dillon, Johnstone, & 
Longden, 2012; Patel, 2011) to explain subsequent psychological deficiency and 
also ‘genetic vulnerability/ at risk’ discourses (e.g. Laajasalo & Häkkänen, 2004) to 
evidence a predisposing deficiency. This construction is analogous with previous 
findings from professionals’ accounts (Pickersgill, 2009) and with wider 
preoccupations in the literature (see section 1.6). Though both were present, the 
extent to which participants privileged one discourse over another varied: 
 
Extract 5  (Clara: 102-120) 
Kitty: erm so you talked about his sort of early childhood experiences 
(.) how much do you think or erm do you think that those play into 
psychopathy happening later, and if so, can you tell me a little bit about 
your understanding of that? 
 
Clara: (3) I’m sort of- I suppose how we see psychopathy, I suppose 
the manifestation that ends up in a forensic unit <K: yes> erm I think (.) 
that that sort of erm uncontrollable desire to hurt or damage or or have 
power over other people in that way um (.) I think is necessarily a 
product of that. Its its an identification with the aggressor and it is 
certainly something to do with the violence and abuse and neglect that 
people have suffered at a younger age. I mean I I I don’t know, I’d have 
to read more about it but I suppose my tacit assumption is that (.) if you 
have these traits and you had a a ‘good enough’ upbringing, I think 
you’d be able to to inhibit them and you know make them- ‘just make 
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an effort, pull yourself together (LG) no’ [with irony] I think you’d be 
able to inhibit them, or perhaps channel them  
 
Clara’s construction is articulated as contextually contingent and thus applicable to a 
certain ‘kind’ of psychopath; one whose violence is both uncontrollable and a product 
of childhood trauma. In so doing, she outlines a cause-effect relationship between 
adverse early life events and psychopathy, specific to the context of forensic mental 
health. Previous research into the effects of childhood trauma on later presentations 
resonates here (e.g. Weiler & Widom, 1996; Weizmann-Henelius et al., 2010). Clara 
introduces psychological theory in order to make sense of this relationship; 
‘identification with the aggressor’ is a psychodynamic concept (Freud, 1966) which 
constructs the psychopath as both victim and perpetrator by conceptualising them as 
interrelated and indivisible. A language of positivism is also implicit in seeking to 
establish identifiable causes for psychological phenomena. Through such talk, the 
psychopath becomes a complex figure who can be better understood via expert psy-
knowledge. Simultaneously, a message of victimhood is emphasised; this talk makes 
available a position for clinical psychologists as both expert and defender, and 
resists dominant constructions of the psychopath as simplistically ‘bad’, a finding 
which may indicate a counterpoint to previous research into professionals’ accounts 
of psychopathy (Richman et al., 1999).  
 
Through an ‘at risk’ discourse, psychopathy is conceptualised as comprising 
predisposing traits which can be inhibited or activated by early life experiences. ‘At 
risk’ talk, as a discursive mechanism, moves explanations of psychopathy beyond 
simplistic reductionist accounts and into a moral social space, whereby early 
childhood experiences can either perpetuate or negate the onset of a disorder. This 
construction comes from a psychiatric discourse, the ontology of which presumes the 
body as the site of psychopathology (Rose, 2007), and also from a psychological 
discourse, drawing on the theories of the ‘good enough’ parent (Winnicott, 1971). 
Through this interaction of discourses, a relationship between psychiatric disorders 
and clinical psychology practice is established. This account manages contemporary 
critiques of clinical psychology (e.g. Smail, 1993) by introducing a socio-
environmental dimension. At the same time, it reconstructs the psychopath as 
psychologically distressed; the psy-complex power/knowledge constellation (e.g. 
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distress/treatment) is thus reproduced and maintained. Previous research into 
professionals’ accounts of psychopathy uncovered similar discursive processes 
(Pickersgill, 2009), although here the interjection of a psychology-specific discourse 
via the application of specific psychological theories makes explicit a manifesto for 





Extract 6  (Clara: 130-144)  
[…] psychopathy is a defence erm a defence against psychosis erm (.) 
and the fragmentation of the mind that that implies and also at the 
route of that is erm (.) a just a a terrible, terrible attachment disorder, a 
deeply disorganised attachment in the sense that (.) the child really 
hasn’t been able to (.) establish any any sort of stable internal object, 
so everything’s terribly frightening and awful and I think the people we 
see, you can see that, it coexists doesn’t it and people move in and out 
of that; it’s often people have attracted- and he13 talks about this, 
people have attracted several different diagnoses throughout their 
lives, most commonly personality disorder, some kind of PCL-R 
assessment that indicates psychopathic traits and erm just psychosis 
or psychotic disorder erm and that coupled with sort of depression, 
anxiety and other things, but yeah. So psychopathy is the sort of cold-
front, if you like, of the the the sort of terrible sequela of disorganised 
attachment.  
 
A system of profession-specific knowledge is established, through which the 
psychopath can be understood via complex psychodynamic formulations. Again, an 
image of a psychologically deprived child is called upon to emphasise a sympathetic 
stance and also to legitimise a nuanced, non-reductive conceptualisation; co-
occurring expert and subversive subjectivities are accomplished (see sections 3.3.2 




                                                          
and 3.3.3). The construction of psychopathy as a sad consequence of an adverse 
early life and some form of predisposing characteristic localises explanations of 
psychopathy at the level of care-giving and nurture experiences and is articulated as 
ultimate evidence for the authenticity of object relations and attachment theories 
(Ainsworth, 1969; Brody & Rosenfeld, 2002). Thus, psychopathy’s status as 
archetypal personality disorder is reproduced (Crego & Widiger, 2014). This 
construction also neutralises the need to investigate wider, societal-level factors 
(Ramon, 1986) by relocating the ‘badness’ of psychopathy, as per lay-
understandings, from the individual to the parent-child constellation. Thus, a focus on 
the perpetrators of abuses is avoided (Patel, 2011). Moreover, in locating a forensic-
specific construction of the psychopath as damaged but comprehensible through 
particular psy-knowledges, and by drawing on an ‘at risk’ discourse, a legitimate 
claim can be made for state intervention in order to prevent future psychopathy; this 
claim is explicitly made elsewhere in the dataset and fits with contemporary research 
agendas related to the identification of juvenile or ‘fledgling’ psychopathy (e.g. 
Lynam, 2002; Skeem & Petrila, 2004).  
 
3.3 Subjectivities within Contested Practice 
Across the dataset, participants constructed psychopathy as having a contested and 
problematic status within forensic mental health contexts in a number of ways, 
echoing concerns raised in the literature; the concept was described as lacking 
clarity, and talk of service limitations enabled a questioning stance in relation to its 
usefulness (e.g. Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Skeem et al., 2011; Walters, 2013). 
Additionally, misconceptions and misapplication of the label were highlighted, as 
were stigmatising and labelling effects, both from the public (e.g. Sieff, 2003) and 
within forensic services (e.g. Bogojevic et al., 2013). Within this professional context 
of contested practice, a variety of subject positions were taken up, that is, a location 
with a structure of rights and duties (Davies & Harré, 1990). These variously resisted 
and conceded to a discourse of biomedicalism, whilst concurrently drawing on 
alternative psychological discourse, which served to legitimise practices such as 
formulation and reflection. This oscillation between subject positions required 
participants to selectively acquiesce and resist dominant ideologies. For example, 
diagnostic accounts of psychopathy were conceded to as necessary for accessing 
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services, while their reductionist nature was emphasised, pointing to formulation 
practices. Thus, dual subjectivities of pragmatism and subversion co-existed, as did 
other, seemingly diametric arrangements. As such, this section examines 
participants’ subjectivities, how they are formed via technologies of power and self 
and how they engage in self-regulatory practices (Foucault, 1988b). Practices made 
possible through these subjectivities were in service of a wider psy-project, i.e. 
proposing a biopsychosocial framework for understanding the psychopath (as an 
apparent alternative to a biomedical framework) and a simultaneous proposal for 
psychologising the workforce (see section 3.4). Therefore, available subjectivities 
both reproduced and re-produced power/knowledge constellations. 
 
As discussed, participants constructed psychopathy as a clinically elusive concept 
(“slippery”, “unclear”, “misunderstood”) revealing a degree of ontological uncertainty 
resonant with concerns raised in the critical literature (e.g. Gunn, 1998; Pickersgill, 
2009b). When orienting to problems with psychopathy theory and practice, 
participants often emphasised personal beliefs, values and preferred ways of 
working as contrasted to wider institutional requirements, which were constructed as 
limited and limiting; as one participant stated “it’s hard sometimes to be the best 
psychologist you can be all of the time” (Evelyn: 327-328). This self-positioning can 
be understood as a discursive mechanism through which practitioners sought to 
manage professional personae within a morally contested landscape (Harré & Van 
Langenhove, 1999). It is also interpretable as a small act of discursive resistance, 
whereby clinical psychologists problematise diagnostic regimes of truth.  
 
A wider assumption of the ‘untreatability’ of psychopaths precluded a renegotiation of 
psychology’s role, given that individualised talking therapies are traditionally seen as 
the central component of clinical psychology work. In positioning themselves as able 
to redeploy psychology skills in service of wider systems, the subjectivities that 
participants took up through their talk were in line with broader contemporary political 
aims to expand the reach of the profession beyond the therapy room, into positions 





Subject positions co-occurring across the dataset have been categorised according 
to three overarching subjectivities: pragmatist, subversive, and expert/specialist. 
 
3.3.1 Psychologist as Pragmatist 
Often negotiated alongside testaments of higher-level critique, and co-occurring with 
discursive constructions of the psychopath as challenging, participants’ talk 
produced a subjectivity of pragmatic practitioner. Through this subjectivity, the use of 
the psychopathy label was made reasonable and related assessment practices were 
legitimised as helpful explanatory devices: 
 
Extract 7  (Beth: 218-242) 
Kitty: So I wondered um if you had any thoughts about the theory 
behind ‘the psychopath’, based on your experiences, based on what 
you’ve read, based on your work with I suppose personality more 
broadly. 
 
Beth: I guess, I mean (2) this is where I feel thinking of a diagnosis as 
your best guess working hypothesis to guide (.) what’s gonna be useful 
is what I come back to again and again um (3) I don’t know, I mean I’m 
kind of thinking about the checklist (.) I suppose the way I think of it is, 
(.) how realistic is it to expect someone to change and so it’s more 
about (2) working with them to enable them to have the best life and to 
interact in the best possible way with everyone in their lives (.) he (2) 
there was some really, really complex stuff things going on with his 
family as well and he (.) sexually assaulted his daughter when she 
came in to visit him whilst he was on the ward, which was (.) just awful 
erm and I think that kind of shifted our expectations of, you know, if he 
was doing that during visiting time on a ward (.) we really, really kind of 
thought about how (.) it just felt impossible to think about giving him 
leave and certainly thinking in terms of discharge it was kind of (2) 
umm it just felt impossible and I think (.) that I suppose the theory with 
psychopathy you’re- in terms of risk- you’re really, really are likely to 
get, you know, high recidivism rates and I think again, just in realistic 
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expectations and I hope that doesn’t sound like we wrote him off, but I 
think it was probably more a kind of reality check on what he was 
gonna be able to manage (2)  
 
In emphasising a pragmatic approach to diagnosis and simultaneously emphasising 
its fallibility, Beth contingently acquiesces with existing diagnostic power/knowledge 
constellations; there is a hidden tautology here resembling an ‘it is what it is/ it’s the 
best we have’ approach to current practices. Beth aligns with and uses the dominant 
discourse to understand a clinical dilemma, but from a position of limited concession; 
she negotiates her relationship to diagnosis as one that is troublesome but 
necessary, emphasising her personal values in the process, thus legitimating its use 
in specific contexts. This reasoning is applied to diagnostic features of the PCL-R, 
producing a construction of individuals with psychopathy as psychologically deficient 
and incapable of change, mirroring a tendency for therapeutic pessimism noted in 
the literature (e.g. Salekin, 2002). Beth positions this as knowledge that is in the best 
interests of the service user by drawing on principles of collaboration and 
enablement, central to professional psychologists’ public identity (Holmes, 2002). In 
this way, the therapeutic aim shifts from producing change to facilitating quality of 
life, conceptualised as a more realistic goal. Across the dataset, improved quality of 
life was asserted as a central aim of interventions with psychopathic individuals; 
given the frequency of this discursive mechanism across participants’ accounts, it is 
perhaps significant that this shift in therapeutic focus does not explicitly arise in the 
wider literature. Here, restrictions imposed by both the diagnostic category and the 
forensic system are implicitly acknowledged; hence, possible therapeutic outcomes 
are renegotiated in accordance with extra-discursive restrictions. Beth articulates a 
concern that this is misinterpreted as hopelessness, suggesting anxiety in relation to 
this shift in the therapeutic endeavour and a degree of discomfort with the 
subjectivity she inhabits at this juncture.  
 
A pragmatist subjectivity is emphasised by drawing on ‘real life’ examples; in the 
example Beth provides, offending behaviour (sexual assault) is discursively tied 
together with a ‘risk’ discourse and serves to make common-sense the need to 
consider public protection alongside an individual’s care, demonstrative of tensions 
highlighted in the critical literature (e.g. Parker et al., 1995; Richman & Mason, 
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1992). The expectation that mental health professionals are responsible for ensuring 
public safety is a relatively recent phenomenon (Appelbaum, 1988), part of the move 
towards “the absolute protection of others” via control of the individual (Foucault, 
1990, p. 144) . A complex relationship between, and layering of, medical and legal 
frameworks, in order to jointly conceptualise and manage the problem of 
psychopathy, it is implicit here (Medina & McCranie, 2011). Thus, an internally 
constituted theory of offending is established which constructs the psychopath as 
pathologically predisposed to offend (a medicalisation of offending) with a 
corresponding position as risk-manager made essential to the clinical psychologist, 
via their status as official mental health worker. In this way, a pragmatist subjectivity 
reproduces asymmetric power relations and makes essential extra-discursive 
practices at the macro-level, such as formalised, state sanctioned protocols for risk 
management (e.g. Department of Health, 2007a). As in extract 3, earlier research 
into forensic staffs’ tendency towards management rather than therapy work for 
individuals with psychopathy is resonant (e.g. Bowen & Mason, 2012).  
 
3.3.2 Psychologist as Subversive 
In various ways, participants positioned themselves as defenders, protectors, ethical 
and critical practitioners in relation to psychopathy thinking and practice. Subversive 
or critical subject positions were taken up by participants in relation to talk which 
problematised the psychopathy label on a variety of grounds: for being 
misunderstood by others; for being overused; for being established via an 
assessment which did not adequately account for a person’s strengths; or for the 
stigma resultant from its application. Several of these concerns mirror those raised in 
the literature (e.g. Link & Phelan, 2001; McPhail, 2013; Singh et al., 2011). Notably, 
a concern that the label leads to an absence of ‘strengths’ work appears to be a 
unique finding, not previously noted in the literature.  
 
The subversive subjectivity can be understood as a form of stake management 
whereby participants sought to highlight their status as morally conscious 
psychologists by distancing themselves from problems with the construct (Woofitt, 
2005). It was also a subjectivity from which participants critiqued current practice and 
proposed alternative modes of thinking, often drawing on humanist, person-centred 
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and strengths-based discourses to do so, thus reflecting a position for clinical 
psychologists as multi-modal practitioners (McFall, 2006). In the following extract, 
Danielle recounts a time in her professional life where personal principles of fairness 
and ethical practice compelled her to take subversive action: 
 
Extract 8  (Danielle: 909-934) 
Kitty: Do you ever engage in processes of reassessment? 
 
Danielle: I have got a really interesting example (.) about this actually 
about somebody I worked with who had been (2) assessed er- it was a 
PCL-SV- assessed as being under the threshold for cut-off, but then 
she went through a really hostile period and was really really difficult to 
work with, this was before I joined the team, very dismissive and 
um lacking in empathy towards other people and so on, and it was 
interesting that at that most difficult time, she was rerated and scored 
very highly erm and then, by then several years on she was about to 
be discharged and I had to re-evaluate it because actually she was 
back to where she was at the beginning, and I think there was 
something very much there about, when she was so difficult and 
challenging to work with, I think people just wanted answers or a 
simple explana- not a simple- you know, erm (.) a way to understand 
this <K: mm> when actually I think there was a a a the a with this 
particular woman and it’s you know, and I think she was always gonna 
do this, is at a time she feels most vulnerable, she becomes 
very dominant and wants to be very powerful you know (.) and I felt like 
just- and again this is my bias, and it’s a shame that people who were 
there at the time couldn’t speak to this, cos there might’ve been a 
whole other reasons and I might just be reading between the lines 
incorrectly erm (.) but it felt that, again, just doing something like that 
just to kind of- is that really understanding what’s going on? If it was 
done without a formulation, it might’ve been done with a formulation 




Danielle constructs the psychopath as simultaneously challenging and vulnerable, 
drawing on diagnostic features of psychopathy and a language of compassion to do 
so. In particular, she draws on the principles of reciprocal roles, a cognitive analytic 
principle which assumes that underlying psychological distress is manifested in 
counter-correspondent actions (e.g. vulnerability-domination). Through her 
construction, Danielle acquiesces to diagnostic/psychiatric discourses whilst 
simultaneously drawing on psychological concepts. This oscillation between 
dominant and alternative discourses serves to re-produce power/knowledges about 
psychopathy and legitimise an imperative to understand the psychopath as 
psychologically damaged (see section 3.2.4). Danielle evaluates past actions via a 
lens of specialist psy-knowledge; although aware that she is problematising the 
subjectivity inhabited by the team (pragmatist/non-critical), she expresses discomfort 
with the alternate subjectivity she inhabits (subversive/critical) and negotiates this by 
highlighting the legitimacy of colleagues’ imagined disagreement. Thus, she caveats 
her evaluation by stressing that the PCL-SV (Hare et al., 1995) may have coincided 
with a formulation, which would negate her concerns. In this way, via a subversive 
subjectivity, formulation becomes an essential practice which reinforces earlier re-
production of the power/knowledge constellation (psychopath/psychologically 
damaged).  
 
Danielle draws on principles of individual responsibility to position herself as ethically 
compelled to reassess the individual being described. Implicit in this talk is a self-
regulatory process which enables acts of resistance; from a subject position as 
ethical and moral practitioner identification of ‘unfair’ practices is possible, pointing to 
counter-practices which contravene scientific assumptions about psychopathy. i.e. 
that it is a stable construct (e.g. Blair, Peschardt, Budhani, Mitchell, & Pine, 2006). 
Thus, a subversive subjectivity enables counter-practices such as reassessment, 
which query existing disciplinary power/knowledge arrangements. Danielle is then 
asked about her motivation to reassess. She responds: 
 
Extract 9  (Danielle: 945-952)  
Because it just didn’t feel fair <K: why not?> Thinking about- well 
thinking about the PCL-SV construct that it should be static and life-
long (.) you know <K: ok> it just, she’d got better, she’d become more 
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trusting of professionals, you know. There were times where she could 
be quite- and again a a the ways that we rate it here is that we have 
like kind of like a a a matrix, I suppose, evidence for, evidence against, 
so I was able to balance and go back and look at the evidence for it 
against, you know.  
 
In being called to justify a subversive act, Danielle draws on a scientist-practitioner 
discourse and so contextualises her subversion within a wider acquiescence of the 
dominant hegemony. Objective, “evidence” techniques are emphasised as part of 
the decision-making process; forms of knowledge production typically privileged by 
the psy-disciplines (Harper, 2004). Thus, the rhetoric of clinical psychology as an 
evidence-based, scientific discipline is reemphasised and its worth according to the 
delineated boundaries of the psy-complex is retained (Rose, 2009).  
 
3.3.3 Psychologist as Expert/Specialist 
Expert or specialist subjectivities were prevalent across the dataset in multiple forms, 
pointing to particular practices for clinical psychologists; demystifying psychopathy 
for non-psychologists, supporting challenged staff, and describing specialist, 
objective knowledge were some of the roles and actions arising from this subjectivity. 
Such actions resonate with critical commentary regarding psychology’s (and 
psychiatry’s) long-standing mandate to provide treatment for, and be experts on, 
deviant behaviour (e.g. Medina & McCranie, 2011; Sarbin & Mancuso, 1970), with a 
consequent effect of rendering psychological practices such as formulation and 
reflection essential (see section 3.4). Discourses underpinning this talk were both 
psychiatric and psychological; through these, a biopsychosocial framework for 
psychopathy was made possible (e.g. Paris, 1998) and an expert subjectivity 
enabled its status as legitimate knowledge: 
 
Extract 10  (Gary: 310-350) 
Kitty: And you mentioned a moment ago that psychopathy- […] it was 
helpful for the team as a sort of method of formulation? Are there any 
other ways that it feels like a useful (.) erm diagnosis or way of 
understanding someone, that you’ve experienced in your work? 
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 Gary: yeah because it- just as with any good formulation, and 
sometimes diagnosis, that it can lend itself to (.) er (3) paradoxically 
perhaps, given the you know emotive label, it can lend itself to a erm (.) 
less pejorative understanding of (.) the behaviour and a more useful 
understanding of how to reduce its frequency and how to help the 
individual achieve some better quality of life. 
 
Kitty: why paradoxically? 
 
Gary: because the word psychopath comes with lots of emotional 
baggage (.) erm but in the context of a good clinical team, who are (.) 
trained to understand how to interpret that label, and how to (2) work 
with people with that label (.) erm like I say, it can improve the quality of 
their lives, and it can reduce the (.) extent to which they challenge 
services, hurt staff, hurt other patients and themselves. 
 
Kitty: and that baggage, is that something- versus sort of how erm 
clinicians can interpret it, is that the sort of difference between the lay 
understanding psychopathy and our clinical understanding of 
psychopathy? 
 
Gary: (2) erm (BR) is that (.) is that the difference? Yes it is, because if 
I was to give someone that label in a clinical context, I would ensure 
the team (.) surrounding them fully understood what it meant, and that 
might be a team whose only experience of the diagnosis has been 
associated with (.) films involving criminal characters (.) or erm (2) a lay 
sense developed through other media accounts of psychopathy, which 
are likely often to be misplaced. 
 
Kitty: and how would you ensure that? 
 
Gary: by describing its (2) core characteristics (.) by describing the erm 
evidence associated with (.) what we know about it’s er inception and 
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(.) erm development, what we know about the sort of infant (.) child 
adolescent correlates in diagnosis, you know just lending a sort of 
pathway understanding to its manifestation.  
 
Gary highlights an available critique of the psychopathy label, that it is emotive and 
potentially pejorative; however, his reconstitution of the label as something that, 
through formulation, can actively reduce stigmatising effects re-positions 
psychopathy as potentially liberatory. Moreover, by citing improved quality of life as a 
possible outcome, the label is constructed as being in the best interests of the 
service user and the potential for harmful labelling effects are, therefore, 
acknowledged and neutralised. Gary’s account aligns with a post-positivist tradition 
of establishing and targeting observable indicators of psychopathy and with priorities 
of the wider literature base (e.g. Coid, 1993); this corresponds with findings from 
earlier research into professionals’ text (Federman et al., 2009). Thus, through an 
expert subjectivity, emerging concerns relating to potential iatrogenic harm are 
undermined (e.g. Granello & Gibbs, 2016). A ‘risk’ discourse is also implicit in this 
talk, with risk reduction and the therapeutic endeavour constructed synonymously. 
An economic discourse is apparent, demonstrative of the biopolitical imperative 
inherent in the organisation and reproduction of forensic psychiatric systems 
(Foucault, 2008); formulation is the arrangement by which both staff and service user 
can be most benefited according to multiple axes: Risk, management, safety and 
quality of life. This process is constructed in the context of service development, 
pointing to the potential for psychology to claim expertise in this regard, in line with 
contemporary moves beyond the therapy room and a drive for the profession to 
demonstrate its value (British Psychological Society, 2010; Newnes, 1996). 
 
Gary elaborates this therapeutic endeavour further; the subjectivity he inhabits 
(expert), and the consequent action this enables (training staff to better understand), 
constructs a corresponding subjectivity for clinical staff, whereby they are 
transformed into a site for management and improvement. An ‘insight’ discourse is 
implicit here; professional psychology is positioned as able to conduct an 
‘assessment’ of staffs’ understanding of psychopathy according to prevailing 
diagnostic and scientific knowledges (e.g. Hare & Neumann, 2008). In so doing, a 
problematised subjectivity is proposed for non-psychology staff, who are constructed 
72 
 
as likely to be clouded by “misplaced” lay-understandings of psychopathy. An expert 
subjectivity, promulgated via specialist knowledge, thus transforms non-psychology 
staff into objects for insight assessment; a finding resonant with previous critical 
research (Gilbert, 2001). Common sense practices arising from this process are 
psychologising the workforce via shared formulations and reflective practice (see 
section 3.4). At the same time, Gary implies personal responsibility for the production 
of a psychologised workforce; principles of evidence-based practice, diagnostic 
features and developmental correlates are knowledges he must impart to less 
knowledgeable others. In this way, the professional capacities of the scientist-
practitioner psychologist, founded upon the identification and treatment of specific 
variables, are similarly a site for assessment by others. Inhabiting an 
unproblematised expert subjectivity requires Gary to unquestioningly reproduce 
prevailing knowledges; in so doing, he too is made “docile and capable” (Foucault, 
1991, p. 294). 
 
3.4 Establishing a Psychological Imperative for Psychopathy Practice 
The previous sections demonstrated ways in which participants constructed 
psychopathy as problematic; juxtaposing concerns were produced relating to both a 
problem individual (dangerous, challenging, manipulative, psychologically damaged), 
and a problem label requiring management via particular professional subjectivities 
(pragmatist, subversive, expert/specialist). Participants also problematised 
established diagnostic understandings and practices as reductionist and limited, 
utilising psychological language to propose alternatives to, or enrichment of, current 
understandings of psychopathy.  
 
In considering the implications of these constructions for clinical psychology practice 
within forensic settings, participants’ talk produced an imperative for the use of 
psychology technologies such as reflective practice and supervision across the 
workforce, as modes of making sense of the (incomprehensible) psychopath, to 
increase empathy and reduce ‘burn-out’; a neoliberal psy-project whereby staff are 
objectified as sites for individualised intervention. Additionally, via formulation 
technologies, a ‘psychologically-minded’ construction of the individual with 
psychopathy was promoted, rendering visible their psychological deficiency and 
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damage; this construction was positioned as beneficial to staff in increasing their 
compassion, as well as to service users in recognition of their status as vulnerable 
mental health patient. Across participants’ talk then were processes of pastoral 
power which transform subjectivities of staff, psychologist and service user 
(Foucault, 1982). 
 
The remainder of the analysis and discussion will look in more detail at how this 
psychological imperative is negotiated and made possible through participants’ 
speech acts relating to formulation, reflective practice and supervision; while this will 
be presented in two parts, these technologies can be said to work together in service 
of the overarching psy-project.  
 
3.4.1 Formulation: Constructing a Psychological Status for Psychopathy 
Psychological formulation was constructed by participants as a means to protect 
against diagnostic reductionism and the ‘seeping in’ of lay understandings of 
psychopathy; as in the wider literature, both actions were conceptualised as 
potentially stigmatising and problematic (e.g. Boyle, 2007; McPhail, 2013). Thus, 
aspects of the forensic system were positioned as simplistic or troublesome in 
relation to psychopathy. Psychology technologies (i.e. formulation) were proposed as 
a solution to this, professing to centralise a person’s context and enrich otherwise 
reduced identities, so constructing a biopsychosocial framework for psychopathy 
(e.g. Paris, 1998). This is in line with wider professional assumptions, whereby 
formulation is considered to be an alternative to diagnosis (Carey & Pilgrim, 2010) 
and has status as an official psychology technology (Kinderman & Tai, 2009). The 
psychological theories participants drew on to achieve this were multi-
modal (psychodynamic, schema, cognitive analytic, motivational interviewing, 
systemic). However, when participants talked about formulation, the extent to which 
they drew on notions of ‘context’ as an important aspect of psychological formulation 
varied across accounts; occasionally, participants constructed formulation as an 
alternative to diagnostic labelling. More often, formulation and ‘contextualising’ were 
identified as practices that could ‘add to’ the diagnostic label. At other times, the 




In constructing a psychologised model of psychopathy, psychologists enriched and 
contextualised the object of the psychopath, and also reproduced him/her as a site 
for governance, control and treatment, including psychological treatment. This 
mirrors previous literature (e.g. Ramon, 1986), however, participants’ talk also re-
produced existing power/knowledge arrangements about psychopathy by positioning 
clinical psychology as a central stake-holder, via ownership of psychology-specific 
technologies. Participants typically negotiated this re-production from inside the 
structures of wider dominant discourses, thus reproducing hegemonic ideology. 
Through their talk, participants connected multiple, disparate discourses, so 
constructing the psychopath as a unique ‘kind’ of person, one who is both mad and 
bad (Hacking, 2006):  
 
Extract 11  (Clara: 151-183) 
Kitty: (.) and you mentioned there, right at the start, about sort of 
conflicting accounts of psychopathy and what it engenders and how it 
could be very difficult for staff members to work with people with that 
diagnosis erm (.). So how- what does psychology offer to that? Can it 
offer anything to that? You know, what’s your understanding of that? 
Erm  
 
Clara: in in um- I was gonna say with psychopathy- actually with erm in 
forensics in general I think that erm (.) probably the most valuable thing 
psychology has to offer is is consultation, reflective practice and group 
work with the staff (.) and that’s certainly- erm when we started an LD 
forensic ward, that was our explicit goal was to create a staff team who 
had erm the same formulation, who all held erm a kind of simplified 
version of a formulation in mind at all times, which guided the care of 
the patient and that I think is is (.) better for the patient than a few one-
to-one sessions with- (LG) and, so the work would be- I suppose the 
work with this man who was, you know (2) very difficult to help, to put it 
like that, I suppose the work I did with him was to gain a better 
understanding of of of his reality, his world view, his internal world and 
how that might have affected him and then work together as a staff 
team so- one of the things we did together, and this was this was 
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planned  with the team, erm we sort of wrote his autobiography in a 
way, erm it was difficult to do because as I said he’s completely 
fragmented, erm but it was it was- we were able to pull out certain 
themes and at the end of that we were able to, I suppose, erm bring 
out certain things that he found valuable or important in his life um that 
lead to the practical work the ward OT erm and she just took some 
things and was able to work on them with him, and I suppose the aim 
was not only to improve his quality of life but also (.) to allow the the 
team as a whole to understand what a horrible time he’d had <K: mm> 
and to be able to see the boy (.) who had once been present I 
suppose, as naff as that sounds, the inner child (LG) [said ironically].  
 
The questions I pose here both imply and enable the subsequent talk, in that they 
are underpinned by an assumption that psychology may be uniquely positioned to 
address ‘staff difficulties’. Clara takes this up by describing several practices in the 
purview of clinical psychology; the status of consultation, reflective practice and team 
formulating (so-called ‘indirect work’) are elevated to “the most valuable” practices 
within a psychologist’s repertoire. As in other extracts, this is concordant with a 
contemporary ‘leadership initiative’ and recent proposals that clinical psychologists 
are uniquely placed to support staff (Onyett, 2012). Previously noted by Rapley and 
Miller (2003), a simultaneous ‘giving away’ and retaining of psychology is made 
explicit here; via intervention from a psychologist, staff can acquire a “simplified 
version” of specialist knowledge. Moreover, through formulation technologies, a staff 
team can be created that ‘does’ care practice according to these psychological 
knowledges. Thus, staff teams are a conduit for the propagation of psychological 
discourses that produce particular ways of being with individuals identified as 
psychopathic (and all forensic service users). This resonates with recent interest in 
team-driven formulations as a practice by which an individual’s life circumstances 
are centralised (Summers, 2006). A potential effect of this is to expand awareness of 
‘signs and symptoms’ away from their diagnostic counterparts by reinterpreting them 
into understandable responses to distressing experiences (Johnstone, 2013).  
 
Throughout this talk, multiple psychological languages and theories are drawn on, 
such as collaborative working, psychodynamic concepts and person-centred 
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principles. Clara takes up a subject position of expert and constructs psychological 
knowledge as at once specialist and accessible to others. The imperative for a 
psychologically informed understanding of the psychopath is reinforced through a 
discursive construction of the psychopath as very challenging and hard to help, 
echoing wider concerns relating to staff ‘burn-out’ (e.g. Ministry of Justice, 2011b; 
Oddie & Ousley, 2007). In so doing, the psychopath is established as the object of 
help and a corresponding position of ‘helper’ is made available to staff, with a caveat 
that psychology knowledges must be internalised in order to gain a “better 
understanding” of the psychopath-object, through which the worker can practice care 
“at all times”. This talk exhibits a process of governmentality in action, whereby the 
psy-project (a psychologised workforce) makes staff teams into objects for 
improvement via psychological technologies (e.g. formulation), in turn making 
available a ‘better helper’ subject position. 
 
As in extracts 7 and 10, the therapeutic endeavour is reconceptualised on behalf of 
the service user to a focus on “quality of life”; implicit in this talk is an 
acknowledgement that forensic environments may be challenging for service users, 
and also that ‘higher’ therapeutic goals (i.e. discharge) may not be possible, echoing 
a state of ‘therapeutic pessimism’ noted in the literature (Salekin, 2002). As such, a 
related therapeutic endeavour is proposed: to enable staff teams to become aware 
of a service user’s vulnerability via specialised psychological knowledge. The 
underlying implication is that through this process staff will experience increased 
compassion towards individuals with psychopathy which will alleviate punitive 
treatment and stigma. Here, and elsewhere in the data, a default (problematised) 
position is constructed for staff as ‘empathy-deficient’ and ‘unknowledgeable’, 
reflecting concerns raised in the wider literature (Bogojevic et al., 2013; James & 
Cowman, 2007). Clara takes up a corresponding position as responsible for 
redressing this (via an expert subjectivity). Thus, pre-existing power/knowledges 
which enable clinical psychologists to inhabit positions of expertise regarding service 
users’ feelings are re-produced to include expertise on the feelings of whole teams 




3.4.2 Supervision and Reflective Practice: Psychologising the Workforce 
Other technologies central to the imperative put forward by these discourses were 
supervision and reflective practice, constructed as practices which enable staff to 
retain an emotional distance from their work and provide protection from 
psychological harm resultant from working with psychopaths. Supervision has status 
within professional psychology as a valuable tool for self-improvement (Holloway, 
1995). It is also an institutionally regulated practice for monitoring best practice and 
staff competency (e.g. Care Quality Commission, 2013). Likewise, reflective practice 
has become a standardised practice across healthcare contexts, however, it is a 
broad terminology which can mean many things, and is used and understood 
differently within and between professional groups (Finlay, 2008). Therefore, in the 
context of this study, I was guided by participants’ descriptions; these typically 
constructed reflective practice as a regular, dedicated meeting, separate from case 
management tasks, which could be utilised by all clinical staff to explore professional 
difficulties within a safe environment. Furthermore, participants identified that 
reflective practice was often, but not always, facilitated by a psychologist and that it 
usually consisted of some focus on, or examination of, the underlying psychological 
processes during interactions between staff and service users. The types of 
psychological theory and models informing these meetings varied. In line with 
current healthcare priorities, it was also conceptualised by participants as an antidote 
to poor client care, ‘burn-out’ and a ‘lack of compassion’ (Graham, 2000; Miller & 
Jack, 2008; Oddie & Ousley, 2007). Thus, participants aligned with broader cultural 
preoccupations of the healthcare sector, pointing to a (possibly unintended) political 
agenda underpinning this talk.  
 
These practices can be understood as part of a wider ‘talking is healing’ rhetoric 
present within modern mental health services and, arguably, across wider 
sociocultural contexts (Harley, 1999). The psychologist, as a trained ‘talking healer’, 
is thus primed to take on the subject position of helper, with staff as the 
corresponding object of help. Indeed, clinical psychology professes commitment to 
reflection as a crucial component of therapeutic work (British Psychological Society, 
2006). In this way, clinical psychologists are implicated in a process of pastoral 
power re-enactment, whereby they hold specialist knowledges in service of 
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transforming a psychologised workforce. Moreover, often implicit in participants’ 
accounts was an alternative discourse, which could be described as a ‘talking is 
improving’ discourse; here, spaces for staff to deconstruct their emotional responses 
are ultimately underpinned by a service development agenda (e.g. Johns & 
Freshwater, 1999): 
 
Extract 12  (Harriet: 79-123) 
Harriet: Um (2) I think it's around a lot in working with teams, as well. 
There is- people I think- almost, people get elevated in mythological 
status sometimes. You know, you get a bit of the, this man's a 
psychopath, so there's a lot of anxiety created immediately before that 
person even arrives on the ward, and (.) how best to handle them, and 
(1) um (3) I think people can be a little bit less sympathetic, (.) a little bit 
less patient, with, (BR) with that individual, and (1) be immediately sort 
of, being quite defensive, I think. Not wanting, I'm not going to be the 
one that's sort of duped or whatever. I'm not going to let him get one 
over on me, and. Yes, I think that's around quite a bit, as well. 
 
Kitty: Would you say there's a role for psychology um in (2), with, inside 
a team, to help manage some of that stuff, some of that anxiety? And 
some of that, um sort of like suspicion, it sounds like? 
 
Harriet: Definitely. I think probably quite central. I think certainly that's 
how it's worked here, really. So you'd be part of the ward rounds, trying 
to offer sort of a psychological perspective on it, trying to help think 
about (1) what its function is, where it's come from (.) what it 
realistically means (BR) (1) day-to-day in sort of thinking about 
managing that individual. Sort of helping the, the team think about 
that's- particularly the nursing staff who have to manage people on a 
day-to-day basis. Much more difficult than, you know, the psychologist 
who comes on for an hour a week or whatever to see that person. (BR) 
Um (1), helping them think about boundaries, all that kind of stuff. 
Training we get involved with as part of the induction. And we can do 
sort of subsequent training for the ward if it is recognised as a need or 
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required. Um we also have reflective practice, I think which is a key 
element there, so. <K: Oh, okay> We have uh weekly (2) reflective 
practice here, uh (1) which I think is great- I never worked somewhere 
you have weekly. Um so it's fantastic. We're able to facilitate that. Quite 
often, it's the psychologists or one of the, sort of, (.) psychological 
therapists that we have here that facilitate that. (BR) And so we also 
participate in that as well as facilitate it. Um so I think that's, 
yes, essential, really, to kind of help think about what gets evoked by 
these individuals, what is getting triggered is us, what's getting 
triggered in them, and, sort of, what the interaction is, the dynamics 
that are going on, (BR) (1) thinking of the way forwards. So there's that, 
that we (.) get involved with as well. And then (BR) I have before, sort 
of, worked with, maybe, primary nurses who’ve got a particularly 
difficult individual, trying to support them and offer some individual 
supervision or a space to think about (BR) (1) what's going on and, you 
know, how best to manage some of those complex interactions that 
can arise (cos) they can be some very tricky individuals, I think, to work 
with.  
 
Here, as at other points in the dataset, staff are constructed as reductionist in their 
understandings of and responses to psychopathy; over-simplistic, ‘lay 
understandings’ are recruited into this construction and positioned as illegitimate and 
harmful forms of knowledge. In particular, Harriet foregrounds and problematises a 
tendency to ‘mythologise’ the psychopath figure, which resonates with wider 
research (Hamilton, 2008). At the same time, discursive constructions of the 
psychopath as challenging legitimise staffs’ problematised responses. As in extract 
11, my leading question as to whether psychology has a special role is taken up by 
Harriet; through our discursive interaction, a position is made available for clinical 
psychologists as critical-experts of staff and service users. However, by emphasising 
that ward staff have to “manage” these challenges on a daily basis, Harriet 
demonstrates awareness of a relational imbalance between psychologists and other 
staff, thus repositioning herself as sympathetic and non-blaming. She then ‘joins 
with’ the team and, in so doing, constructs herself as a ‘self-reflexive practitioner’ in 
need of reflection practices and so reinforcing professional priorities (British 
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Psychological Society, 2006). The language of education and growth is also utilised 
in this talk, suggesting that self-knowledge can be cultivated by others who hold the 
right expertise. In this way, self-knowledge becomes a legitimate object for 
intervention; “thinking about” what has been evoked and triggered, as well as “ways 
forwards”, become tools for this intervention, with clinical psychologists taking up a 
position as expert intervenors. Thus, a process of pastoral power is acted out, with 
the aim of transforming the workforce according to a ‘psychologising’ ideology. 
 
As in extract 10, an ‘insight’ discourse is in operation in this talk, whereby staff 
become objects of evaluation and assessment by a more knowledgeable other. This 
interaction enables psy-practices that address insight through increasing self-
knowledge. These practices are constructed as essential aspects of forensic 
working, in order to ‘protect’ oneself from psychological distress and to better 
understand and empathise with service users, thus reinforcing earlier problematised 
discursive constructions of the psychopath, and reinforcing previous research which 
suggests that personality disordered service users are the most disliked and 
emotionally challenging (e.g. James & Cowman, 2007; Lewis & Appleby, 1988). 
Psychological language is drawn on to describe the effects of self-reflection; 
psychodynamic ideas are implicit, including notions of transference and 
countertransference (e.g. Temple, 1996). At the same time, a reduction in pejorative 
and emotive responses is a therapeutic goal of these interventions. Thus, the subject 
undergoing self-reflective work is objectified according to these various principles, 
and a version of self is produced that is orientated to and through psychodynamic 
(psychological) knowledge, as well as in line with a positivist discourse which 
privileges rationality and neutrality as preferred modes of being. In this way, non-
psychology staff are made the objects of a psychologising project which, on the 
surface, could be said to align with post-modern/liberatory principles of ‘giving away’ 
psychology (Miller, 1969). However, a tension is present within this talk in the form of 
a coinciding tacit assumption that self-knowledge requires continual replenishment, 
meaning a limited position is available to others as ‘psychologised non-psychologist’ 
and a corresponding limiting position to clinical psychologists as ‘psychologising 
psychologist’. Thus, a pendulum effect ultimately ensures stasis and a reproduction 
of existing power/knowledge structures, aligning with professional preoccupations of 
‘psychologists as leaders’ (Onyett, 2012). 
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 Also implicit in this account is a professionalisation of compassion coincident with 
wider contemporary concerns regarding healthcare practice (e.g. Department of 
Health, 2012). Previously a lay-term, compassion has been reconstituted by health 
and social care institutions into a quantifiable professional skill that is objectively 
evaluable across the workforce, and has been cited as an important factor in the 
various failings of the NHS (Bradshaw, 2009). This reification process re-produces 
compassion as a legitimate object for intervention and staff are subjectified 
accordingly. In this way, technologies of professional psychology such as reflective 






4 CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CRITICAL REVIEW  
 
The aim of this chapter is to consider the main analytical findings in the context of 
the research aims and questions. I will begin by revisiting these aims and, with these 
in mind, I will summarise key findings from the analysis, situating this in the wider 
literature. I will then review the research in relation to findings from previous relevant 
studies outlined in chapter one, which are resonant in various ways. I will then 
critically evaluate the study according to ‘credibility’, ‘transparency’ and ‘rigour’ 
criteria, outlined by Spencer and Ritchie (2012); these are considered to be recurrent 
principles of robust qualitative research, irrespective of epistemological position 
(Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 2003). 
 
4.1 Summary of Findings 
 
To recap, the research questions for this research were: 
 
1. How are professional and wider socio-cultural contexts imbricated in how 
clinical psychologists construct psychopathy? 
2. What discourses are produced through these constructions? 
3. What are the implications of these constructions for clinical psychology 
practice within forensic settings? 
 
The first two questions were addressed via close examination of participants’ 
accounts about their work with, and understandings of, psychopathy. Throughout, 
persons with psychopathy were constructed as problematised individuals in a variety 
of ways: dangerous, challenging, manipulative, psychologically damaged. Psychiatric 
and diagnostic discourses of classification and related traits were frequently drawn 
on in order to describe psychopathy, privileging associated biomedical assumptions 
of individualism and internal pathology. Reliance on psychology and psychiatry 
technologies (formulation and diagnostic labelling) in order to ‘understand’ and make 
sense of individuals was apparent. An ‘at risk’ discourse constructed individuals with 
psychopathy as having a pre-existing vulnerability to developing the disorder; this is 
resonant with findings from previous discursive literature (e.g. Pickersgill, 2009a) 
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suggesting the availability of this discourse for forensic practitioners, beyond the 
bounds of the present research. However, the ‘at risk’ discourse was also located 
alongside a ‘trauma’ discourse and rooted in a ‘forensic specific’ context, which 
constructed individuals with psychopathy in forensic mental health settings as victims 
of their early life experiences; this appears to relate to previous studies into the 
presence of a relational interaction as contributing to the manifestation of 
psychopathic traits (e.g. Brody & Rosenfeld, 2002; Giovagnoli et al., 2013; Weiler & 
Widom, 1996). More specifically, however, this is a novel finding for critically-
informed discursive research into psychopathy and may indicate the presence of 
fine-grain distinctions within constructions of the psychopathy construct. Multiple 
psychological theories were utilised to legitimise this discourse. Additionally, 
‘intuition’ talk occurred across participants’ accounts. This straddled scientific (clinical 
judgement) and mythical (a “feeling” or “sense”) discursive locations, further 
distinguishing individuals with psychopathy as both ‘other’ and otherworldly, as well 
as emphasising that the concept itself is elusive. Previous discursive research 
findings on the presence of an overlap between ‘professional’ and ‘lay’ 
understandings of psychopathy is resonant here (Federman et al., 2009; Hamilton, 
2008), as well as legitimising concerns in the literature base regarding the use of 
expert opinion during court proceedings (Scott, 2014). Perhaps most significantly, 
this research finding serves to operationalise previous research into clinical 
limitations of the use of psychopathy as a psychological concept (McPhail, 2013). 
 
Combined, this talk produced psychopathy and those so ascribed as simultaneously 
bad and mad, and located them in a unique moral and social space, implying a 
psychologically-informed psychiatric (or, indeed, a psychiatrically informed 
psychological) understanding for psychopathy; what has been described in the wider 
literature as a biopsychosocial model (Paris, 1996, 1998). These findings dovetail 
with the wider essentialist research agenda which prioritises investigation of a 
biological hypothesis for psychopathy and, increasingly, a neurobiological hypothesis 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2011). Interest in psychosocial factors is positioned through this 
lens, with ‘signs and symptoms’ of psychopathy (i.e. behaviours and characteristics) 
understood as manifestations of some form of psychological damage. As other 
research has suggested, a biopsychosocial model can be understood as 
biomedicalism reimagined, in that it enables deficit discourses and depoliticises 
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distress (Pilgrim, 2002). Processes of medicalising deviance and reifying 
psychopathy were therefore operant in participants’ accounts, making a culture of 
social control a legitimate reaction (practice). This is concordant with concerns raised 
by critical researchers (e.g. Cohen, 2002; Gunn, 1998). 
 
The present research findings connect with that of the wider literature; as 
demonstrated in Chapter One, psychopathy has a status as a longstanding social 
and moral dilemma, with footholds in both lay and professional contexts. It is 
positioned as a form of disordered personality (mental illness), placing it within the 
purview of the psy-professions and so endorsing practices concordant with a 
biomedical/biopsychosocial paradigm (e.g. psychiatry and psychology). However, as 
with other so-called personality disorders, this position and related practices are 
morally contentious and ontologically uncertain (Pickersgill, 2009b; Pilgrim, 2001), 
meaning that practitioners’ status as morally adequate is implicitly in question 
(Jayyusi, 1984; Manning, 2000). In line with this, participants oriented to dilemmas 
regarding psychopathy in forensic settings, thus constructing a problematised 
professional context. This meant that it was incumbent on those being interviewed to 
justify and legitimise their position, so as to manage their status as morally and 
professionally credible.  
 
The analysis revealed that participants negotiated a contested professional context 
via particular subjectivities. These were: (1) a ‘pragmatist’ subjectivity which 
functioned to warrant the use of the label and related practices within an imperfect 
system; (2) a ‘subversive’ subjectivity which demonstrated disagreement with 
elements of psychopathy practice, either conceptually or through counter-practices; 
(3) an ‘expert’ subjectivity, through which psychopathy could be demystified via 
psychological knowledge, so solving potential problems with, or limitations of, the 
label. Across these subjectivities, a discourse of biomedicalism was variously 
resisted and reinforced, implying a tension underlying the ontological position of the 
clinical psychology profession, in that it seeks to frame itself as both a scientific and 
a socio-moral endeavour. Across their accounts, participants emphasised personal 
belief systems as contrasted to wider institutional requirements, which can be 
understood as another discursive mechanism through which participants sought to 
manage professional personae (Harré & Van Langenhove, 1999). That participants 
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grappled with these seemingly paradoxical enterprises throughout their accounts 
indicates that this predicament remains unresolved and is a source of tension for 
individual practitioners as they seek to align personal and professional preferred 
selves within a morally contested landscape. To date, the present study is the first to 
examine subjectivities available to professionals working with individuals identified as 
psychopathic. Thus, this analysis of the discursive processes underpinning clinical 
psychologists’ professional positioning is an original contribution to the literature 
base and provides a meaningful platform for future research. 
 
The third question was addressed via an examination of the material and social 
practices implicated by these constructions and related subjectivities, both for the 
clinical psychology profession and for those within its professional purview (Harper, 
1999). These amounted to what can be described as a psychological imperative for 
psychopathy. Central to this was the promotion of three core psychology 
technologies; formulation, supervision and reflective practice. These practices were 
constructed as solutions to the ‘problem’ of psychopathy in different ways: 
formulation was presented as a vital means by which other professionals could 
become better informed about the ‘disorder’ away from stigmatising lay-
understandings, leading to an improved, more objective practice. Within this, a 
tension across participants’ accounts was apparent as to whether the term 
psychopathy was a formulation in and of itself, or whether the term needed to be 
formulated in order for it to be useful. This micro-level tension is perhaps reflective of 
broader ontological confusion noted in the wider literature (e.g. Skeem et al., 2003). 
Moreover, this distinction is important given recent critiques of psychiatric diagnostic 
systems as failing to attend to an entire dimension of distress experiences 
(Vanheule, 2012). Formulation was also constructed as a means by which a 
person’s early life experiences could be contextualised in relation to current 
psychopathology, underpinned by a biopsychosocial discourse.  
 
Supervision and reflective practice were also central to an underlying psychological 
imperative; participants indicated that clinical implications of these interventions were 
an increase in empathy and a protected position of emotionally removed safety for 
staff. Supervision and reflective practice have cultural valence in contemporary 
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healthcare contexts, thus the promulgation of these psychology-specific technologies 
aligns with wider socio-political anxieties. Implicit across this talk was the notion of 
‘insight’ and the implication that, through these various practices, individual and team 
insight (including clinical psychologists’) could be targeted and increased. These 
findings connect with those of the wider literature; in particular, the presence of 
‘therapeutic pessimism’ and ‘empathy deficiency’ towards those with a psychopathy 
label is reproduced here (Salekin, 2002; Bogojevic et al., 2013), suggesting that this 
may be a consistent and ongoing issue within psychopathy practice, and that these 
concepts may simultaneously reinforce, and be embedded within, available 
discursive constructions. 
 
In summary, findings revealed a positioning of clinical psychology as a vital meaning-
maker in an endeavour which proposes a limited re-production of social and material 
practices pertaining to psychopathy, seeking to shift current practices into a more 
‘psychologically-conscious’ domain, without dismantling overarching dominant 
ideology (Edley, 2001). Whilst this can be interpreted as strategic compliance, small-
scale change from within a system can facilitate incremental realignments in 
hegemonic discourses (Bracken & Thomas, 2010) thus enabling the possibility for 
alternative subjectivities for individuals labelled as psychopathic, and alternative 
ways-of-knowing for those who work with them. Thus, possible dominant discourses 
though which clinical psychologists discursively make sense of the psychopathy 
construct have been expounded, as have the subjectivities and praxis dilemmas for 
clinical psychologists in the forensic field. 
 
4.2 Comparison with Other Research 
The results of the present research echo Richman and colleagues' (1999) findings, in 
that both studies demonstrate the presence of an imbrication of ‘disease’ and 
‘deviance’ discourses in participants’ constructions of psychopathy. Both studies also 
serve to highlight that although psychopathy is understood by clinical professionals 
via psychiatric language, their priority in terms of intervention is often at the level of 
management of the individual and protection of others. However, in contrast to 
Richman et al.’s findings, the results of the present research did not uncover 
discursive constructions of ‘evil’, rather, participants sought to depict individuals with 
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psychopathy as damaged as well as damaging. Given that Richman et al.’s study 
investigated accounts of psychiatric forensic nurses, this may indicate that different 
discursive constructions are more or less available across professional groups.  
 
The findings of the present research were resonant with Hamilton's (2008) analysis 
of contemporary accounts of psychopathy. In particular, ‘intuition’ talk and the elusive 
nature of psychopathy revealed a mythologic tendency in professionals’ accounts 
and demonstrated that psychopathy assessment processes were at least partially 
subjective. As studies into other contested phenomena have shown, social (‘lay’) 
representations are locatable at the centre of understandings of psychological and 
medical constructs (Manuti & Mininni, 2010). Thus, distinctions between 
clinical/professional knowledges and lay knowledges about psychopathy are 
overstated; popular and scientific conceptions of psychopathy are overlapping and 
reinforcing, rather than dichotomous (Garton, 2001). This is perhaps unsurprising 
when one considers that extreme morally and socially objectionable problems, which 
are unreceptive to medical treatments, are more likely to be conceptualised via 
psychiatric and psychological language and simultaneously imbued with moral 
overtones (Gunn, 1998). Combined, these studies demonstrate that accounts about 
psychopathy are located in an indeterminate space between scientific fact and 
fiction, thus suggesting a transparent exercising of socio-political control, constructed 
as neutral science. However, unlike Hamilton’s analysis, accounts from the present 
research cannot be said to entirely ignore the absence of an objective, scientifically 
solid basis for psychopathy. Instead, participants attempted to negotiate this through 
professional subjectivities which enabled particular stances and practices in relation 
to its problematic status. 
 
The results of Federman and colleagues' (2009) study uncovered a totalising 
psychiatric power, whereby individuals with psychopathy were depicted as unnatural, 
legitimising categorisation via diagnostic frameworks and emphasising a position as 
threat to social stability. In a similar way, discursive constructions in the present 
study implicitly demarcated outer limits for what is ‘normal’, with individuals and their 
behaviours frequently described as incomprehensible without the label, thus 
enabling norming processes to occur (Hacking, 1996). Findings from both studies 
demonstrate that professionals and academics use the psychopathy construct in an 
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attempt to explain and understand deviancy through categorisation. However, the 
effect of this is to produce a self-fulfilling double bind (Bateson et al., 1956; Gibney, 
2006). In contrast to Federman et al., the accounts from the present research did not 
reproduce notions of psychopaths as ‘evil monsters’ and implied variations within the 
power/knowledge constellation between psychology and psychiatry; participants 
sought to foreground notions of psychological damage and related concepts, 
therefore constructing individuals with psychopathy as victims as well as 
perpetrators. In comparing these studies, nuance and disagreement within psy-
complex knowledges is apparent, with clinical psychologists attempting to engage, to 
some extent, in thinking about the effects of environmental and social factors on 
individuals’ lives. As discussed, accounts rarely elaborated or ‘thickened’ this type of 
talk, suggesting a lack of availability of these constructions and related discourses 
for practitioners (Geertz, 1973). Academic expert texts emphasise that there is “no 
convincing evidence that psychopathy is the direct result of early environmental 
factors” (Hare, 1999, p. 170), thus the lack of thick descriptions of psychopathy in 
this vein is perhaps unsurprising.  
 
Similar to Pickersgill's (2009a) study into the accounts of neuroscientist researchers, 
participants constructed psychopathy as a psychological deficiency, acknowledging 
early life experiences as factors in the manifestation of the disorder. As with 
Pickersgill’s findings, a sophisticated biomedical discourse underpinned this 
construction, drawing on an ‘at risk’ discourse with the effect of negotiating criticisms 
of reductionism. However, the interjection of psychology-specific language also 
produced a manifesto for the use of psychology-specific knowledge and practice in 
order to address a somatically located psychopathology. The present research has 
conceptualised this as a biopsychosocial discourse, which is in the particular purview 
of the clinical psychology discipline.  
 
4.3 Credibility 
According to Spencer & Ritchie (2012) research can claim credibility in its adherence 
to defensible and plausible arguments, based on the evidence generated. I have 
fulfilled this criterion in a number of ways: Firstly, I reflexively engaged with multiple 
works of Foucault over a three-year period. In doing this, I have attempted to ground 
89 
 
my research in an embedded awareness of Foucauldian theory and concept to 
produce a theory-driven analysis which fully attends to its methodological aims. 
Secondly, I have been a member of a peer-led four-person ‘analysis group’; 
membership to this group was based on chosen methodology (FDA). On a weekly 
basis, we each brought an anonymised transcript excerpt and would spend an hour 
separately analysing these, before coming together to share and justify our analytic 
work. At later stages of the write-up process, my ‘fully-formed’ analyses were 
scrutinised and questioned by the group. Thirdly, my supervisor provided feedback 
and critique on a draft of my analysis, ensuring that my analytical work was 
grounded in the data. Combined, these processes have ensured that the findings 
produced by this research are internally and theoretically coherent and persuasive 
(Willig, 2001). 
 
4.4 Transparency and Rigour 
Transparency and rigour are essential in order to contextualise qualitative research 
findings, and refer to a systematic and transparent process of collection, analysis 
and interpretation of data (Spencer et al., 2003). A clearly outlined rationale for the 
development of this research and the research questions was provided in chapter 
two. Furthermore, a detailed outline of analytical process was provided and 
limitations of this have been considered (see section 2.5). Initial themes and extracts 
of annotated data (Appendices L-N) provide an audit trail for the analytical process.  
 
4.5 Reflexive Review 
As discussed (see section 2.6) a reflexive dialogue which seeks to actively question 
one’s own knowledges is an essential component of quality-evaluation in research, 
and allows the researcher to consider ways in which their subjectivity and meaning-
making has influenced the research process (Henwood & Parker, 1994; Willig, 
2001). Therefore, in this section I will endeavour to interrogate the research 





4.5.1 Epistemology and Methodology 
A critical realist social constructionist epistemological position was adopted in this 
research. Criticisms of this approach and my rationale for its application have been 
discussed (see section 2.1). In line with this position, the analysis developed an 
account of ways in which extra-discursive factors influenced participants’ discursive 
constructions of psychopathy (e.g. policy and practice guidelines) and informed 
possible subjectivities for clinical psychologists working with individuals with 
psychopathy (e.g. responsibility for public protection informing therapeutic aims). As 
such, the research has attempted to establish that language constructs knowledge 
and social realities, but that material boundaries impact what is available and 
prohibited (Willig, 2008).   
 
However, at times I found it difficult to straddle social constructionist and critical 
realist positions simultaneously; in attempting to create a dialogue between them I 
may have undermined the central tenets of each. For instance, consideration of the 
lived reality for professionals and service users (e.g. restrictive service structures), 
as well as interactions experienced as distressing, difficult or destructive, 
compromised my ability to maintain a critical stance towards prevailing knowledges 
about psychopathy and, at times, deterred me from examining how psychopathy is 
socially constructed through talk. Likewise, criticisms that there are no formal 
organising principles by which to distinguish the discursive from the non-discursive 
are applicable (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007). When required by the analytical process 
to move beyond an investigation of extra-discursive features impacting on discursive 
constructions and subjectivities, in order to make inferences about the ‘real world’, 
the absence of a systematic method disinclined me from articulating analytical 
thought (Willig, 2008).  
 
My own repertoire of ‘common-sense’ knowledges and related practices have been 
informed by several years of professional experience in forensic systems. Reflecting 
on the chosen epistemology, a preference for constructionist perspectives towards 
prevailing discourses and power structures may have, therefore, been tempered by 
my ‘lived experiences’ of forensic work and the discourses by which I have been 
subjectified. In hindsight, I wonder whether it felt safer to engage with the dataset 
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from a critical realist social constructionist stance, so as not to perturb my own 
regime of truth; in so doing, I may have avoided ‘speaking truth to power’ (Worley, 
2009). 
 
With regards to the methodology, I sought to ensure coherence and plausibility 
through the use of a systematic and thorough analytical process, however 
researcher bias should be acknowledged; for instance, during my reading I was 
especially interested in the ways in which psychologists explained psychopathy 
within their talk and the types of work that were implied as necessary by this. It is 
reasonable to surmise that another researcher may have been drawn to different 
elements of the data and thus arrived at conclusions alternative to those presented 
here. 
 
4.5.2 Data Collection 
Given the extreme nature of prevailing discursive constructions of psychopathy, 
when clinical psychologists were asked to talk about their work it is perhaps 
unsurprising that a dis-ease with underlying assumptions was expressed and 
negotiated throughout their accounts. However, the relationship between the 
interviewee and interviewer also bears consideration (Frith & Gleeson, 2012). For 
instance, it is possible that asking professionals to describe how and why they work 
in particular ways implies that the legitimacy of their practices are being called into 
question (Kovacova, 2013). Indeed, scepticism as to the motives of the researcher, 
and what might be ‘uncovered’ about current practices, were concerns articulated by 
those who declined to participate in the study. Related to this, my position as a 
trainee clinical psychologist from the University of East London, well-known for its 
critical and critiquing stance, may have led participants to feel a need to justify their 
stance and practices in relation to psychopathy. In attempting to negotiate this, I am 
aware that I often adopted a ‘one-down’ position in my interview style, such as 
prefixing my follow-up questions with statements like ‘I don’t know the answer to this, 
but…’. In turn, this may have influenced the subject positions that participants were 




Additionally, several of the participants were ex-colleagues; it is reasonable to 
assume that a pre-existing relationship impacted on the type of talk that was 
possible. For example, at times participants evoked my professional identity in order 
to legitimise a point. The following brief extract is an example of such talk: “and you 
know Kitty, you’ve worked with people, you […] know there are people who really, 
really struggle with the theory of mind” (Clara: 499-500). Had there not been a prior 
relationship between myself and Clara, she may not have drawn on assumed shared 
knowledge in this way, possibly resulting in a different type of talk. Likewise, had I 
not had a prior relationship with Clara, I may have felt more able to question the 
assumptions implicit in her talk at this point. Related to this, my use of the word ‘we’ 
at times during the interview process is worth reflecting on as it has multiple 
discursive effects: (1) it evokes my professional identity in line with those I am 
interviewing; (2) it removes me from personal responsibility, in that my stake as an 
individual in problematic concepts is downplayed; (3) it emphasises the presence of 
an institution to which clinicians, including myself, belong and are bound by, so 
justifying present practices through shared ownership. 
 
Through the interview process I have become acutely aware of the use of taken-for-
granted language, including my own, across mental health contexts, the most 
obvious being the use of the word ‘psychopath’. As the interviewer, I sought to 
remain aware of the potential impact of my choice of words (Baker, 1997); despite 
this, the interviews were physically and discursively situated in a forensic, psychiatric 
context. As such, psychiatric and diagnostic language was difficult to avoid and I am 
aware that at several points across the interview process I ‘acquiesced’ to the 
seeming necessity of this. A potential consequence of this is that assumptions 
inherent in these ways of talking were not fully explored. However, it is also possible 
to interpret this experience as an effect of extra-discursive practices impacting on 
what is possible to say, pointing to the power of psychiatric language in facilitating 





5 CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
 
In chapters three and four, I presented an extensive analysis of interviews with eight 
clinical psychologists in conversation about psychopathy. In this chapter I will explore 
clinical implications of the research and arising recommendations, followed by in-
depth consideration of the research findings and contributions, in the context of the 
wider literature.  
 
5.1 Implications and Recommendations 
 
The findings of this research point to important clinical and research implications in 
relation to psychopathy in forensic settings. Arising recommendations are aimed at 
mental health professionals working with those identified as psychopathic, those 
involved in service and policy development, and researchers investigating the field. 
The implications and recommendations discussed here are not exhaustive, rather 
the aim is to provide an illustration of current concerns and related possible future 
directions based on the research findings. It is my hope that by introducing these 
recommendations across professional and academic contexts, it will be possible to 
foster “subversive discursive practices and spaces for resistance” (Willig, 1999, p. 
12) which will impact positively on the lives of those with a label of psychopathy. 
 
5.1.1 Stigma and Labelling 
Participants’ recurrent articulation of psychopathy as a stigmatising label is 
suggestive of a form of structural discrimination (Link & Phelan, 2001). While 
participants attempted to address this through increasing others’ knowledge and 
shared team formulations, the potential impacts of this stigma were not fully explored 
in their accounts. As McPhail (2013) emphasises, the psychopathy label can divert 
clinicians away from in-depth consideration of traumatic experiences and the effects 
of these on an individual. Several participants attempted to engage with this, 
however, their constructions were ‘thin’ in contrast to prevailing problematised 
constructions (Geertz, 1973). As well as negative responses from others on the 
basis of stigmatised identities (Bogojevic et al., 2013) research into stigma effects 
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has shown that stigmatised individuals negatively evaluate themselves, leading to 
maladaptive behaviours and impaired recovery (Livingston & Boyd, 2010). There is 
potential for psychological theory to be informative in this regard. For instance, 
Hatzenbuehler's (2009) psychological mediation framework of stigma provides a 
framework through which to illuminate the relationship between stigma and mental 
distress in order to inform clinical interventions. Clinicians might consider such tools 
to assist them in conceptualising the lived experiences of individuals with a label of 
psychopathy, providing a means by which the intra and interpersonal psychological 
processes implicated in stigma can be examined (McPhail, 2013).  
 
Despite acknowledging the limitations of the label, participants repeatedly articulated 
that it would not be possible to do away with it because it stands in for an experience 
that mental health professionals find difficult to understand, and that labelling is a 
part of contemporary human life. This belief is echoed by commentators advocating 
in favour of diagnostic systems (e.g. Green, 2013). If labelling is an inevitable 
process, a potential solution might be to re-vision the label away from its 
controversial history. One possible alternative might be for clinicians to begin using 
the term ‘high risk, high need’ (McPhail, 2013). This term more appropriately reflects 
that individuals with psychopathy in forensic settings often require high levels of 
therapeutic input and care and moves away from the moral overtones and 
elusiveness of the psychopathy label, shedding its historical baggage in the process. 
While I acknowledge that this is an imperfect alternative in that it draws on other, 
problematic constructs such as ‘risk’, research has indicated that this 
conceptualisation engenders more positive outcomes for individuals (Wilson, 
Cortoni, & McWhinnie, 2009). Labelling theory is resonant here; it may be that the 
label psychopathy promotes deviant behaviour, while an alternative label makes 
different ways-of-being possible (Thoits, 2010). 
 
5.1.2 Formulation 
The findings demonstrated that formulation is used by clinical psychologists within 
forensic settings as a way to contextualise diagnostic descriptions of psychopathy 
and to centralise individuals’ negative life circumstances (Johnstone, 2013). This is 
in concordance with core competencies of the psychology profession, which sees 
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formulation as a means to provide a rich description of psychological distress (British 
Psychological Society, 2011a). However, the results also uncovered a reproduction 
of individualised diagnostic constructions of psychopathy repackaged as a form of 
formulation, likely to perpetuate labelling effects and associated stigma. Given this, 
clinical psychologists working with psychopathy might consider locating 
psychological formulations away from diagnostic labelling in order to ‘thicken’ 
alternative non-essentialist descriptions, which more comfortably align with the aims 
of the wider profession. This is vital if formulation is to continue to function as an 
‘antidote’ to the narrow depictions offered by psychiatric diagnoses (Boyle, 2007). 
Thus, modes of formulation which offer distinct alternatives to a focus on traits and 
behaviours, and which are dynamic and transitive, should be promoted (Harper & 
Moss, 2003).  
 
5.1.3 Reflexive Reflective Practice 
The findings demonstrated the presence of an implicit agenda to promote reflective 
practices across the workforce. As noted, reflective practice was understood by 
participants to mean a safe space in which to examine and understand professional 
relational difficulties. However, reflective practice can also be defined as a space in 
which to “make sense of the uncertainty in our workplaces and […] to work 
competently and ethically” (Ghaye, 2000, p. 7 emphasis added). Given this, it is 
significant that the findings indicate an absence of discussions regarding the 
ontological uncertainties and ethical implications of psychopathy within forensic 
settings; due to its contested status, this should be seen as an essential component 
of reflective discussions. Likewise, the findings indicate that clinical psychologists are 
mostly unaware of the discursive mechanisms, constructions and subjectivities 
extant in their talk. Through examining these aspects in relation to psychopathy, 
professionals may become more aware of the effects of their speech acts and the 
taken-for-granted knowledges through which they practice, leading to more critical 
practices. Heenan (1998) suggests ‘reflexive discourse practice’ as a means by 
which this might be enabled, whereby the clinical focus is expanded in order to 
include consideration of wider professional discourses. Other possibilities for praxis 
might be shared team analysis of, and reflection on, the language used within formal 
documents, such as risk assessments and psychology reports. This may have the 
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effect of bringing an increased awareness to the constitutive power of language and 
to the professional positions inhabited, within an applied context. Irrespective, in 
fostering discursively and ethically-conscious conversations as part of reflective 
practices, clinicians may move away from (or beyond) totalising categories like 
psychopathy, instead seeking out nuanced frameworks for understanding the lives 
and presentations of those with whom they work. It may also mean that clinicians are 
empowered to use the psychopathy label in a knowledgeable way, remaining alive to 
its limitations and implications, as well as acknowledging their role in this process. 
Significantly, this recommendation sits within the boundaries imposed on forensic 
practitioners by extra-discursive practices and is therefore potentially actionable. 
 
5.1.4 Policy and Service Development 
The findings of this research indicate the presence of a complex relationship 
between medical and legal domains; a biolegal space (Foucault, 1988a). If, as its 
professional body suggests, clinical psychology has the capacity to apply its skills 
base to service and policy development agendas (British Psychological Society, 
2010), it is important that this is taken as an opportunity to foster shifts in discourses 
at a systemic institutional level. Through this, it may be possible to develop 
alternative discursive spaces from which dominant psychiatric decontextualised 
constructions can be challenged (Boyle, 2011). 
 
One possibility in this regard is that policy developers, and healthcare professionals 
advising them, emphasise ontological uncertainties related to psychopathy within 
policy and guidance documents. As Pickersgill (2009b) asserts, failing to do so risks 
reifying a controversial and stigmatising category. Policy has a key role in governing 
clinical practice, therefore discussion of practice guidance and its clinical and social 
implications should occur concurrently; to separate them is unethical. In coproducing 
these issues, clinicians will be better placed to make fully-informed decisions about 
their practice. While this may produce a quandary for clinicians to actively navigate in 
daily practice, such awareness-raising is essential in providing ethical healthcare to 




Likewise, service practices should be evaluated in light of the absence of a clearly 
defined conceptual definition of psychopathy (Federman et al., 2009) and 
questioning whether it is appropriate to measure something that is not clearly defined 
in the literature, and which may not be useful. This may relate to extra-discursive 
practices within forensic systems, which can act as boundaries to the production of 
alternative ways of understanding people with this label. For example, the absence 
of any strengths-based clinical tools may reinforce problematised constructions; as 
one participant describing the PCL-R process expressed: “there’s no strengths 
focussed stuff and you only really notice that when you sit down with someone […] 
and you start every session by apologising for the negative focus” (Evelyn: 476-478). 
It is possible that the development and introduction of an alternative, strengths-
based measure for psychopathy, may enable different understandings of the 
phenomenon, or enrich the presently ‘thin’ alternative descriptions that are available 
to clinicians14.  
 
5.1.5 Possibilities for Future Research 
Research can be considered contributory if it advances knowledge or understanding 
about policy, practice, theory or a particular substantive field (Spencer et al., 2003). 
Although the present research analysed data from a small number of clinical 
psychologists within a specific context, the findings provide insight into ways in which 
a particular discursive landscape pertaining to psychopathy is operant. Furthermore, 
in conjunction with the growing body of critically-informed research pertaining to the 
psychopathy classification (e.g. Parker et al., 1995; Pickersgill, 2009a, 2009b), there 
are grounds for generalisability (Myers, 2000). Further research to enable greater 
understanding of prevailing socio-cultural discourses and forms of knowledge about 
psychopathy, and the professional subjectivities that are produced in relation to 
these, is therefore essential (Harper, 1996). As Pilgrim (2001) emphasises, a shift 
away from narrow clinical foci in relation to personality disorders, towards an 
14As previously noted in the literature review (see section 1.2.1), this concept reflects emerging 
research which proposes the presence of an adaptive element to psychopathy in the wider 
population. Likewise, it may also open up the possibility for clinicians to draw from other, non-forensic 




                                                          
enlarged social framework of transdisciplinary knowledge and research needs to be 
fostered.  
 
The discourses underpinning participants’ accounts demonstrated the presence of a 
problematised identity for individuals with psychopathy; conversely, with the 
apparent exceptions of a study detailed by Parker et al., (1995) and Stowell-Smith & 
McKeown's (1999) analysis (see section 1.5), interviews with service users detained 
under the category of psychopathy have not been utilised as a source of research 
data. Research indicates that biomedical models and related psychiatric discourses 
transform service users’ experiences and understandings of mental distress 
(Georgaca, 2013). Thus, future research might investigate how those with a label of 
psychopathy in forensic settings understand the label and the meanings they ascribe 
for themselves through an analysis of their talk. If the aim of psychological qualitative 
research is to provide a platform for “hearing the voices of the excluded” (Ashworth, 
2003, p. 24) then research which seeks to explore the experiences and self-
constructions of people with psychopathy is an essential endeavour. 
 
Additionally, given apparent tensions between psychiatric and psychological 
discourses evident in the present research, and apparent differences with other 
professional groups demonstrated in the literature (e.g. Mason, Caulfield, et al., 
2010; Richman et al., 1999), an investigation of the discourses available across 
professional groups may be an insightful investigation, enabling understanding of 
how different professional discourses and subjectivities are imbricated. Studies in 
other fields (e.g. Stevens & Harper, 2007) have identified that the availability of 
repertoires depends, to some extent, on professional membership; this may have 
implications for practice.  
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6 APPENDICES  













6.3 APPENDIX C: CHANGES TO R&D APPROVAL PROCESSES 
From: XXXX XXXX [XXXX.XXXX@nhs.net] 15 
Sent: 26 October 2015 10:18 
To: Kitty Marie CLARK-MCGHEE 




Thank you for calling Noclor this morning. As discussed, the HRA Approval process 
is the new system for obtaining NHS Permission (or R&D Approval) to conduct 
research in the NHS. This HRA Approval process commenced in August and is 
currently being implemented on a phased basis and will soon replace the 
conventional process for obtaining NHS Permissions (and will be called HRA 
Approval). Completing the IRAS document set will remain the method by which you 
obtain your HRA Approval/NHS Permission. When we spoke I advised you that while 
the HRA Approval process was still in the phasing-in period and it is up to you 
whether you apply for HRA Approval (via indicating ‘HRA Approval’ on Q4 of the 
IRAS R&D form) or remain with the current, standard process of applying for NHS 
Permission via R&D offices for the relevant research sites (via indicating ‘NHS/HSC 
Research and Development offices’ on Q4 of the IRAS R&D form). Having just 
reviewed the HRA guidance, it appears that for studies being completed solely in 
fulfilment of an educational qualification, until further notice, they are to continue to 
apply for NHS Permission as normal so, you are to select in your IRAS R&D form, 
under Q4. ‘NHS/HSC Research and Development offices’. Apologies for the 
confusion here. 
 
I hope the above helps. If you require any further clarification please do not hesitate 





Research Compliance Officer 
Research & Development 
noclor Research Support Service 
 
  
15 Redacted information to preserve anonymity of participating Trusts, services and participants. 
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6.4 APPENDIX D: X TRUST R&D COMMITTEE ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Despite the changes to NHS staff recruitment (see Appendix C), each Trust’s R&D 
department had differing degrees of rigour in their approval processes, hence, some 
of the approvals were granted in the form of a simple email response, while other 
Trusts required evidence of the IRAS document set and a formal peer review of the 
research proposal.  
         [TRUST HEADER] 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 








Dear Kitty Clark-McGhee 
 
Re: Research proposal application to xxxxxxxx dated: 20/10/2015 
Exploring how clinical psychologists in forensic settings construct psychopathy 
 
 
Thank you for your recent research proposal which was considered at the last 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx meeting.   
 
The xxxxxxxx committee has considered your project and I am pleased to inform you that the 
proposal was supported.  xxxxxxxxxx will forward your application to the Trust R&D Office for 
peer review. 
 
Notice that xxxxxxxxxx support DOES NOT mean R&D approval. In order to carry out research 
in the Trust you will need to obtain R&D approval.  First you will need to go 
onto http://www.myresearchproject.org.uk/ and set up an IRAS account. (IRAS stands for 






Dr X [electronically signed] 
   
 
 












6.5 APPENDIX E: X TRUST R&D COMMITTEE ETHICAL APPROVAL 
From: XXXX XXXX [XXXX.XXXX@xxft.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 09 December 2015 14:57 
To: XXXX XXXX 
Cc: Kitty Marie CLARK-MCGHEE 
Subject: RE: RE: Ethical Approval - Project Review 
 




From: XXXX XXXX 
Sent: 29 October 2015 12:42 
To: XXXX XXXX 
Cc: 'uxxxxxxx@uel.ac.uk' 
Subject: RE: Ethical Approval - Project Review 
 
Dear Clinical Director, 
 
The above project was discussed at the Ethics Sub-Committee meeting on Thursday 
29th October 2015. I write on behalf of the Committee to share with you the advice of 
the committee in considering the ethical dimensions of the project. Final approval will 
rest with you as Clinical Director. 
 
Summary of Advice 
 
 
Project 345: Exploring how clinical psychologists in forensic settings construct 
psychopathy   (Kitty Clark-McGhee) 
 
· No ethical concerns 
 
We hope this advice is helpful to you in considering whether to approve this 
proposal. Members of the Ethics Sub-Committee would be happy to discuss this with 
you further. 
 




Quality Outcomes & Experience Analyst 
XXXX NHS Foundation Trust 
Trust Headquarter, xxxxx 




6.6 APPENDIX F: X TRUST R&D COMMITTEE ETHICAL APPROVAL 
From: XXXX, XXXX [XXXX.XXXX@xxxx.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 23 November 2015 15:22 
To: Kitty Marie CLARK-MCGHEE 










Research & Development Manager 
 
XXXX Mental Health NHS Trust (Tuesdays and Thursdays) 
XXXXX Hospital * Tel: xxxxxxxxx * Fax: xxxxxxxxx 
 
xxxxxxxxxxx 
Tel: xxxxxxxxxx * Fax: xxxxxxxxxx 
 
________________________________ 
From: Kitty Marie CLARK-MCGHEE [u1031917@uel.ac.uk] 
Sent: 20 November 2015 11:06 
To: XXXX, XXXX 




In order to keep you updated, I am sending you a copy of the fully authorised IRAS 
R&D offices application and the SSI forms for XXX sites. 
 
Also attached are the submitted supporting documents (participant letter, information 
sheet, consent form, semi-structured interview guide). 
 




From: Kitty Marie CLARK-MCGHEE 
Sent: 15 October 2015 16:45 
To: XXXX, XXXX 




Many thanks for this information. I am indeed in the process of an IRAS application 









-------- Original message -------- 
From: "XXXX, XXXX" 
Date:15/10/2015 14:38 (GMT+00:00) 
To: Kitty Marie CLARK-MCGHEE 




Thank you for your e-mail. If your study involves NHS staff only, it is exempt from 
Ethics review and it will be classed as a Cohort 1 study under the Health Research 
Authority's (HRA) new approval process as of 11 May 2015. This means that you 
can complete the secure online IRAS form 
(athttps://www.myresearchproject.org.uk/Signin.aspx) by creating an account and then 
submitting directly to the HRA for review. 
 
Cohort 1 studies no longer require local NHS permission from R&D Offices within 
participating sites, but there is a need for your university (as the sponsor) and this 
Trust (as the participating site) to assess local capacity and capability as part of a 
general feasibility review beforehand. If you proceed with your application, I would 
respectfully ask that you ensure this R&D Office is kept informed of any progress 
relating to approval of your study. Further information on the HRA approval process 
for this type of study can be found here: http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/our-plans-
and-projects/assessment-approval/hra-approval-cohort-1/#HowToApply. 
 
Please also note that HRA approval is undergoing phased implementation nationally 
and if your study does not meet the criteria for Cohort 1 studies, then it will need to 
go through IRAS and be submitted to this R&D Office for local NHS permission. I will 
be happy to assist you further, if this is indeed the case. 
 





Research & Development Co-ordinator 
 
xxxxxxxxxx Mental Health NHS Trust (Tuesdays and Thursdays) 








6.7 APPENDIX G: CONSENT FORM 
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
 
Consent to Participate in a Programme Involving the Use of Human Participants. 
 
EXPLORING CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS UNDERSTANDINGS OF PSYCHOPATHY 
IN FORENSIC SETTINGS 
 
I have the read the information leaflet relating to the above programme of research in 
which I have been asked to participate and have been given a copy to keep. The nature 
and purposes of the research have been explained to me, and I have had the opportunity 
to discuss the details and ask questions about this information. I understand what it being 
proposed and the procedures in which I will be involved have been explained to me. 
 
I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this research, will 
remain strictly confidential. Only the researchers involved in the study will have access to 
the data. It has been explained to me what will happen once the programme has been 
completed. 
 
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully explained 
to me and for the information obtained to be used in relevant research publications.  
 
Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at 
any time without disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give any reason. 
 

















6.8 APPENDIX H: INFORMATION SHEET 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION LETTER 
 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to consider in 
deciding whether to participate in this study, which is being conducted as part of a doctoral 
degree in clinical psychology. 
 
Project Title 
Exploring Clinical Psychologists Understandings of Psychopathy in Forensic Settings 
 
The Principal Investigator(s) 
Kitty Clark-McGhee 
Email: xxxxxxxxxx Tel: xxxxxxxxxx 
 
Project Description 
This study aims to explore how clinical psychologists understand psychopathy, what knowledge 
and experiences inform these understandings and how this might impact on clinical practice. 
Participants will be asked to discuss this topic during interviews, lasting 45-60 minutes.  
No hazards or risks are anticipated for potential participants. 
 
Confidentiality of the Data 
All names, service locations and other identifying information will be anonymised through coding 
procedures, which will be help securely and separately from transcribed data. Following 
completion, audio recordings will be deleted. Electronic copies of the anonymised transcripts will 
be kept securely for possible research publication at a later date. 
 
Location 
The interviews will be held in a private room at your place of work. 
 
Disclaimer 
You are not obliged to take part in this study, and are free to withdraw at any time during tests. 
Should you choose to withdraw from the programme you may do so without disadvantage to 
yourself and without any obligation to give a reason. 
 
University Research Ethics Committee 
If you have any queries regarding the conduct of the programme in which you are being asked to 
participate, please contact:  
 
Catherine Fieulleteau, Research Integrity and Ethics Manager, Graduate School, EB 1.43 
University of East London, Docklands Campus, London E16 2RD  
(Telephone: 020 8223 6683, Email: researchethics@uel.ac.uk). 
 
 
Thank you in anticipation.  
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6.9 APPENDIX I: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Topics will be negotiated with participants before and throughout the interview 
process.  
Possible topics for discussion may include the following: 
• Why did you decide to take part in this research project? 
• Can you tell me about your work with clients with a psychopathy label?/ What 
is it like to work with people with this label? 
• How do you prefer to work with people with psychopathy? What works best? 
Do these ways of working fit with the service/NHS requirements? 
• How do you ensure that you remain reflective when working with people with 
a label of psychopathy? Are there times when this has been difficult? 
• What contributed to your decision to work in forensic services? Was working 
with individuals with psychopathy part of this decision? Did the possibility of 
working with people with psychopathy appeal to you? 
• What does the term psychopathy mean to you? 
• What have been your personal experiences of working with people with 
psychopathy? 
• Do you think that psychopathy is an important construct in forensic services? 
In what ways? 
• Do you think that popular culture, and the media, contributes towards societal 
understandings of psychopathy? 
• Have you worked with women with psychopathy? If so, how, if at all, is it 
different? Do you think it impacts on their experience and the treatment that is 
offered to them? 
• What are some of the main issues you have experienced whilst working with 
individuals with psychopathy? 
• What support do you think clinical psychologist’s need when working with this 
client group? Is this different than in other professional settings, and if so, 
why? 
• Is there anything else you would like to talk about?      
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6.10 APPENDIX J: RESEARCH TITLE CHANGE 
A title change was requested and approved in order to more accurately reflect 




6.11 APPENDIX K: JEFFERSON-LITE TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS 
Transcription symbol Meaning 
(.)  Pause of less than 1 second 
(2) Pause of one second or more, with 
length (in seconds) denoted in brackets 
(LG) Laughter 
(BR)  Intake of breath 
- Indicates a breakoff of utterance e.g. th- 
text Emphasis by speaker 
(()) Inaudible speech 
XXX In place of any names to preserve 
anonymity 





6.12 APPENDIX L: INITIAL THEMES - DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS 
 
Psychopathy as a feeling An intuition/ a flavour/ a sense, psychopathy 
feels different to other service users, is 
threatening, mythical and non-scientific 
Praxis: clinical intuition legitimate practice 
 
Psychopathy as horrifying The things psychopaths have done are 
chilling/ unsettling/ terrible, others find it 
difficult to be with them, incomprehensive 
behaviours 
Praxis: reflective practice, supervision, 
support for teams  
 
Psychopath as unlikeable Annoying/ nasty/ hard to like, they can make 
staff cynical, cold 
Praxis: important for staff to reflect/ name 
their feelings/ have supervision  
 
Psychopath as manipulative Their actions are deceitful/ dishonest/ 
scheming, they are slippery and devious, they 
lie 
Praxis: important for staff to reflect/ have 
supervision, psychiatric/ diagnostic language 
 
Psychopath as challenging/ trouble 
maker 
Compromise therapeutic work on the ward, 
they are hard work/ difficult to manage, they 
disrupt dynamics/ push boundaries/ split 
teams, they can lead to burn-out 
Praxis: important for staff to have supervision, 
psychological language 
 
Psychopath as dangerous Risky/ high risk, high levels of recidivism, 
dangerous to vulnerable service users, 
dangerous to staff well-being, they are a 
public safety issue, management vs therapy, 
hopelessness 
Praxis: public protection, risk assessments, 
managing expectations (pessimism?) 
 
Psychopath as self-focussed Inherently selfish/ narcissistic, lacking 
empathy, driven to meet psychopathic needs, 
out of control, traditional therapeutic 
motivations do not work for them 
Praxis: novel ways of working? 
 





Psychopath as vulnerable  They have been damaged, have complex 
needs, are helpless/ scared/ victims/ unwell, 
psychopathy is caused by a disturbed 
childhood, psychopaths are psychologically 
impaired/ deficient/ less resilient/ not in 
control 
Praxis: at-risk/ trauma discourse, 
psychological formulation essential/ team 
formulation/ awareness essential 
 
Psychopathy as stigmatised label The label is damaging, psychopaths are 
poorly served/ treated by others, psychopaths 
are victims of system, psychopaths are 
misunderstood/ difficult to understand 
Praxis: raising team’s awareness is essential, 
‘insight’ of staff in question, fighting injustice, 
raising awareness across teams 
 
 
Across multiple readings, these discursive constructions were assimilated into four 
overarching constructions of psychopathy/ the psychopath: (1) dangerous (a feeling, 
horrifying, dangerous, rare); (2) challenging (unlikeable, challenging/ trouble-maker); 
(3) manipulative (manipulative, self-focussed); (4) psychologically damaged 
(vulnerable).  
 
Of note, following subsequent re-readings of the data, ‘psychopathy as stigmatised’ 
was re-interpreted as a practice because it was identified as arising from, and 




6.13 APPENDIX M: INITIAL THEMES – SUBJECT POSITIONS 
 
Psychologist as expert Specialist, responsible for psychopathy 
assessment, knowledgeable, expertise via 
experience, psychology is essential for 
psychopathy 
Praxis: specialist knowledge to offer to teams, 
scientist-practitioner, theory to practice linking 
 
Psychologist as skilled  At working with complexity, working with 
teams (staff insight?), compassionate/ non-
judgemental/ empathic, multi-skilled, 
reflective practitioner, leader 
  
Psychologist as defender  Against injustice, against misuse of labels, 
against lack of knowledge, responsible for 
protecting service users, an advocate/ 
champion/ fighter, fighting against diagnosis, 
fighting for formulation, centralising trauma  
Praxis: biopsychosocial model, psychological 
formulation, promoting psychological thinking  
 
Psychologist as sceptical Suspicious of label, doubtful, questioning its 
usefulness 
 
Psychologist as helping others Demystifying psychopathy, imparting 
specialist knowledge/ facilitating learning, 
reducing stigma through objective knowledge 
(scientist-practitioner), bringing alternative 
perspective (non-medical)  
Praxis: Reflective practice, team formulations, 
introducing psychology to teams 
 
Psychologist as subversive/ critical  Aware of power, aware of limitations of 
diagnosis, theory vs practice, rebelling 
against status-quo, anti-psychiatry 
Praxis: reassessment of PCL-R, talking about 
power with service user, thinking about 
limitations of label 
 
Psychologist as objective Rational, scientist-practitioner, dispassionate/ 
unaffected emotionally, able to use 
knowledge, aware of/ wise to psychopathy 
Praxis: assessment? 
 
Psychologist as pragmatic Realistic, limits to critical stance, aware of 
real-life challenges for ward staff, diagnosis 
best-worst option, the system as limiting, 
need to work within the system, time 
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pressured/ limited by environment, labels 
helpful 
Praxis: label used to help teams understand 
 
Psychologist as ethical Concerned by ethical/ moral dilemmas, trying 
to do the right thing, individually responsible 
for actions, driven by fairness, thinking about 
consequences for individual 
Praxis: reassessment of PCL-R 
 
 
Across multiple readings, these subject positions were assimilated into three 
overarching subjectivities available for participants: (1) pragmatist; (2) subversive 



















6.17 APPENDIX Q: TEXT OMITTED FROM TRANSCRIPTS 
 
Extract 1 … and one of the things I’m really not clear– I don’t know whether you 
have the answer to this, but … 
 
Extract 6 … Rob Hale, I don’t know if you’ve read Rob Hale’s research, he’s erm 
this month he’s giving a talk but he was clinical director at the Tavistock 
<K: ok> and his theories about psychopathy I find very compelling to 
the point of, you know <K: did he write in the Guardian recently?> yeah 
um it’s about how … 
 
Extract 10 … for the woman who had the BPD diagnosis and an LD diagnosis, 
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